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Abstract
The secrecy capacity problems over the general arbitrarily varying wiretap channel, with respect to the maximal
decoding error probability and strong secrecy criterion, are considered, where the channel state sequence may be
known or unknown at the receiver. In the mean time, it is always assumed that the channel state sequence is known
at the eavesdropper and unknown at the transmitter. Capacity results of both stochastic code (with random encoder
and deterministic decoder) and random code (with random encoder and decoder) are discussed. This model includes
the previous models of classic AVWC as special cases. Single-letter lower bounds on the secrecy capacities are given,
which are proved to be the secrecy capacities when the main channel is less noisy than the wiretap channel. The
coding scheme is based on Csiszár’s almost independent coloring scheme and Ahlswede’s elimination technique.
Moreover, a new kind of typical sequence with respect to states is defined for this coding scheme. It is concluded
that the secrecy capacity of stochastic code is identical to that of random code when the receiver knows the state
sequence. Meanwhile, random code may achieve larger secrecy capacity when the state sequence is unknown by the
receiver.
Index Terms
Arbitrarily varying wiretap channel, strong secrecy criterion, secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) is the most general and difficult channel model in two-terminal discrete
memoryless systems (DMSs). Unlike other well-known DMSs, the capacity of an AVC may be affected by the
criteria of decoding error probabilities (average or maximal) and the classes of coding schemes (deterministic,
stochastic or random, see Subsection II-B). To be precise, when studying AVC, the following six kinds of capacities
are considered [30]:
1) capacity of deterministic code with respect to the average decoding error probability,
2) capacity of deterministic code with respect to the maximal decoding error probability,
3) capacity of stochastic code with respect to the average decoding error probability,
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24) capacity of stochastic code with respect to the maximal decoding error probability,
5) capacity of random code with respect to the average decoding error probability,
6) capacity of random code with respect to the maximal decoding error probability.
The idea of applying random code to the AVC originated from Blackwell et al [9], see also Lemma 2.6.10 in
[20]. A random code is a pair of random encoder and decoder (F,Φ), distributed over a collection of deterministic
codes, where F and Φ are correlated. Before each transmission, there exists a third party telling the transmitter
and receiver the exact pair of deterministic encoder and decoder to be used. That kind of information is called
the common randomness (CR) of the random code. CR is critical to random code, but it costs extra bandwidth.
To solve that problem, Ahlswede [30] developed an elimination technique to decrease the rate of CR to arbitrarily
small, and determined all the other five capacities of the AVC except that of deterministic code with the maximal
decoding error, which is still open. Some results can be found in [22].
AVC can be treated as the model of channels with states. However, unlike the models introduced in [6], [36],
the probability mass function of the channel states is unknown in the case of AVC. The problem of AVC with
non-causal state sequence known at the encoder was studied by Ahlswede [31], which was actually an extension
of [36]. An extension of Ahlswede’s work can be found in [3]. Moreover, Csiszár and Narayan [21] considered the
AVC whose average costs of input and state sequence are constrained, and provided the capacity of random code.
The importance of arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC), first introduced in [25], is self-evident. When the
AVWC has constrained state sequence, it includes discrete memoryless wiretap channels [1], [19], wiretap channel
of type II [10]–[12], [24], [26], [27], [41], [42] and compound wiretap channels [17], [34], [35], [40] as special
cases. Moreover, the coding scheme in AVWC can also be applied to wiretap channels with stochastic channel
states [4], [5], [7]. When considering an AVWC, we can assume that the eavesdropper knows exactly the channel
state sequence. Moreover, we often assume that the eavesdropper is able to control the state sequence during the
communication [16], [39].
Bjelakovic´ et al [16] considered a special class of AVWC, where the wiretap channel could be regarded as an
equivalent discrete memoryless channel (DMC). The lower bounds on the capacities of stochastic code and random
code with respect to the strong secrecy criterion [18], [38] were given there. The key idea was migrating the coding
scheme for compound wiretap channels [17] to AVWC with the help of the robustification technique introduced by
Ahlswede [31]. If a random code is applied to the AVWC, the communication is manipulated with the help CR. If
the CR is known by the eavesdropper, he/she may control the state sequence according to the CR. This situation
was considered in [14]. On account of the elimination technique introduced by Ahlswede [30], it suffices to let the
rate of CR be arbitrarily small when the eavesdropper is absent. However, when the eavesdropper exists and the
rate of CR is positive, the CR can serve as a secret key to increase the secrecy capacity, as studied in [23].
Goldfand et al [43] considered another special case of AVWC, where the channel state sequence was constrained
in a certain type. The coding scheme there was based on a stronger version of Wyner’s soft covering lemma [2],
which was first used to deal with the capacity problem of extended wiretap channel II in [42]. The model discussed
in [43] discarded the assumption that the wiretap channel was a DMC. Meanwhile, the capacity was on semantic
3secrecy criterion. However, that coding scheme can not be applied to the general AVWC without constraints on
state sequence.
Some other results on AVWC include multi-letter description of the secrecy capacity [28], [29] and the continuity
on the secrecy capacity [15], [23].
This paper considers the strong secrecy capacity problems of general AVWC without any limits, whose channel
state sequence is supposed to be known at the eavesdropper and unknown at the transmitter. To be concrete, the
following three communication models are considered.
• Arbitrarily varying wiretap channel with channel state sequence unknown at the receiver (AVWC). Lower
bounds on secrecy capacities of stochastic and random codes over this model with respect to the maximal
decoding error probability and the strong secrecy criterion are given. The average decoding error is not
considered in the context of wiretap channel since relaxing the criterion of decoding error does not yield
a larger lower bound. This model includes the models in [14], [16] as special cases. The secrecy capacities
are determined when the main channel is severely less noisy (defined in Subsection VI-B) than the wiretap
channel. Moreover, the coding scheme introduced in this paper can also be readily used to the model of AVWC
with constrained type of the state sequence [43].
• Arbitrarily varying channel with channel state sequence known at the receiver (AVC-CSR). This communication
model was first studied by [37]. We present a new proof here as a preliminary to the proofs of the third model.
The five kinds of capacities, except that of deterministic code with respect to the maximal decoding error, are
determined. Unlike the AVC, it is proved that those five capacities of an AVC-CSR are identical.
• Arbitrarily varying wiretap channel with channel state sequence known at the receiver (AVWC-CSR). Lower
bounds on secrecy capacities of stochastic and random codes over this model with respect to the maximal
decoding error probability and the strong secrecy criterion are given. Unlike the general AVWC, the secrecy
capacity of stochastic code over an AVWC-CSR is identical to that of random code. Moreover, the secrecy
capacity is determined when the main channel is strongly less noisy (defined in Subsection VI-B) than the
wiretap channel.
This paper mainly makes the following two contributions. 1. Introduce a tool of typical sequences with respect to
the channel states. This tool can be used to bound the values of both the decoding error probability at the legitimate
receiver and the exposed source information to the eavesdropper. 2. Extend the almost independent coloring scheme
developed by Csiszár. This scheme could construct a partition on a given “good” codebook to satisfy the strong
secrecy criterion. This scheme has recently been used to deal with the problems of extended wiretap channel II
[10], [11].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the preliminaries for this paper, including
the new definitions of typical sequences and some known results on AVC. Section III summarizes main results
of this paper, including lower bounds on secrecy capacities of AVWC and AVWC-CSR, along with capacities of
AVC-CSR. In Section IV, we introduce some lemmas derived from Csiszár’s almost independent coloring scheme,
which are basic tools for the analysis of security. The proofs of main results are given in Section V. In section
4VI, we determine the secrecy capacities of less noisy AVWC and AVWC-CSR, and consider the models of AVWC
with constrained state sequence. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Throughout this paper, random variables, sample values and alphabets (sets) are denoted by capital letters, lower
case letters and calligraphic letters, respectively. A similar convention is applied to random vectors and their sample
values. The probability mass function of a given random variable X is denoted by PX . Moreover, PXY and PY |X
denote the joint and conditional probability mass functions of the random variable pair (X,Y ), respectively. For a
given AVC or AVC-CSR, e is used to represent the maximal decoding error probability of a deterministic code, e¯
represents the average decoding error probability, and em represents the decoding error probability of message m.
When the code is random or stochastic, e, e¯ and em are random functions of it. In that case, we would use λ, λ¯ and
λm to represent the expectations of e, e¯ and em, respectively. The capacities with respect to the maximal and average
decoding error probabilities are denoted by C and C¯, respectively. Some important notations are summarized in
Table I for reference.
This section provides basic tools for the subsequent sections, including information measurements with respect
to channel states, basic results of AVC, and typicality under the state sequence.
A. Information measurements with respect to channel states
This subsection defines some functions on information measurements with respect to the channel states, which
would be used to characterize properties of typical sequences in Subsection II-C.
Let X be a random variable of probability mass function PX , and YS = (Ys : s ∈ S) be a collection of random
variables satisfying that
Pr{X = x, Ys = y} = PXYs(x, y) = PX(x)Ws(y|x) (1)
for s ∈ S , x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , where S is a finite set and {Ws : s ∈ S} is a family of transition matrices. For any
probability mass function P on S, denote
H¯P (YS) =
∑
s∈S
P (s)H(Ys), H¯P (YS |X) =
∑
s∈S
P (s)H(Ys|X) and I¯P (X;YS) =
∑
s∈S
P (s)I(X;Ys). (2)
It follows clearly that
I¯P (X;YS) = H¯P (YS)− H¯P (YS |X).
Moreover, we also have
min
s∈S
I(X;Ys) ≤ I¯P (X;YS) ≤ max
s∈S
I(X;Ys). (3)
We give an example below, so that the reader can have a clearer idea on those notations.
Example 1: Let X = Y = S = {0, 1}, and W = {W0,W1} with
W0 =
[
1− q0 q0
q0 1− q0
]
and W1 =
[
1− q1 q1
q1 1− q1
]
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IMPORTANT NOTATIONS USED IN THIS PAPER
NOTATION DESCRIPTION
X Common input of both the main AVC and the wiretap AVC (one time of transmission)
Ys, Zs Channel outputs of the main AVC and the wiretap AVC when the channel state is s
(one time of transmission)
Ws, Vs Transition probability matrices of the main AVC and the wiretap AVC when the channel
state is s
S The finite state set of both the main AVC and the wiretap AVC
YS , ZS YS = (Ys : s ∈ S) and ZS = (Zs : s ∈ S)
W,V W = {Ws : s ∈ S} and V = {Vs : s ∈ S}. W is used to specify the main AVC and
V is used to specify the wiretap AVC.
q A specific probability mass function over S
Wq Wq =
∑
s∈S q(s) ·Ws is a convex combination of the transition matrices from W
Yq It follows that Pr{Yq = y|X = x} = Wq(y|x)
P(S) The collection of all probability mass functions over S
M The message set
M The source message uniformly distributed over M
XN Common input of both the main AVC and the wiretap AVC (N times of transmission)
Y N (sN ), ZN (sN ) Channel outputs of the main AVC and the wiretap AVC when the channel state sequence
is sN (N times of transmission)
(f, φ) A pair of deterministic encoder and decoder
(F, φ) A pair of stochastic encoder and decoder
(F,Φ) A pair of random encoder and decoder
λ(W, f, φ),λ(W, F, φ),
λ(W, F,Φ)
Maximal decoding error probabilities of different classes of codes over AVC W
λCSR(W, f, φ),λCSR(W, F, φ),
λCSR(W, F,Φ)
Maximal decoding error probabilities of different classes of codes over AVC-CSR W
U An auxiliary random variable to formulate the secrecy capacity results. U → X →
(YS , ZS) forms a Markov chain.
C A deterministic codebook
C A random codebook
XN (C) A random sequence uniformly distributed over the deterministic codebook C
ZN (C, sN ) Output of the wiretap AVC when the channel input is XN (C) and state sequence is
sN
for some 0 ≤ q0, q1 ≤ 1. Suppose that the random variables X and YS = {Y0, Y1} satisfy
Pr{X = x, Ys = y} = 1
2
Ws(y|x)
for x, y, s ∈ {0, 1}. Then we have
H(Ys|X) = h(qs) and I(X;Ys) = 1− h(qs)
for s = 0, 1. Furthermore, denote by P a probability mass function on S such that P (0) = 1−P (1) = p for some
6Fig. 1. AVC, Arbitrarily varying channel.
real number 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Then it follows that
H¯P (YS |X) = pH(Y0|X) + (1− p)H(Y1|X) = ph(q0) + (1− p)h(q1)
and
I¯P (X;YS) = pI(X;Y0) + (1− p)I(X;Y1) = 1− ph(q0)− (1− p)h(q1).
B. Some known results of AVC
This subsection gives the definition of AVC, and lists some capacity results that have been known. In general,
an AVC is specified by a family of transition matrices, whose size is allowed to be infinite, according to [20], [30].
However, we constrain the size of this family to be finite so as to focus our attention on the security problems
of AVWC and AVWC-CSR.
The definition
Definition 1: (AVC, Arbitrarily Varying Channel) An AVC, depicted in Fig. 1, is specified by a finite collection
of transition matricesW = {Ws(y|x) : x ∈ X , y ∈ Y and s ∈ S}, where S is the finite state set of the channel. For
each transmission, when the channel state s is given, the transition probability matrix of the channel is determined
to be Ws. Denote by XN and Y N the random sequences of the channel input and output, respectively. Then Y N
may be any one of the random sequences from {Y N (sN ) : sN ∈ SN}, where Y N (sN ) is the channel output under
the state sequence sN satisfying that
Pr{Y N (sN ) = yN |XN = xN} = W (yN |xN , sN ) (4)
with
W (yN |xN , sN ) =
N∏
i=1
Wsi(yi|xi)
being the probability that channel outputs yN when xN is transmitted under the state sequence sN .
To characterize the capacity results, let P(S) = {q : 0 ≤ q(s) ≤ 1,∑s∈S q(s) = 1} be the convex hull of S and
W¯ = {Wq : P(S)} (5)
7be the convex hull of W with
Wq(y|x) =
∑
s∈S
q(s)Ws(y|x) (6)
being a convex combination of the transition matrices fromW , where q ∈ P(S). Notice that the size ofW is finite,
but the size of W¯ may be infinite.
The capacity results
As mentioned in Section I, the capacity of an AVC is related the classes of coding schemes (deterministic,
stochastic or random) and the criteria of decoding error probability (average or maximal). In the rest of this
subsection, we list the results of different classes of coding schemes, given in formulas (8), (13) and (15), all of
which come from Ahlswede [31].
Deterministic Code [31]. A deterministic code over an AVC is specified by a pair of mappings (f, φ) with
f :M 7→ XN and φ : YN 7→ M. The maximal and average decoding error probabilities are defined as
λ(W, f, φ) = max
sN∈SN
λ(W, f, φ, sN ) and λ¯(W, f, φ) = max
sN∈SN
λ¯(W, f, φ, sN ),
respectively, where
λ(W, f, φ, sN ) = max
m∈M
λm(W, f, φ, sN ),
λ¯(W, f, φ, sN ) = 1|M|
∑
m∈M
λm(W, f, φ, sN ),
λm(W, f, φ, sN ) = em(W, f, φ, sN ) = 1−W (φ−1(m)|f(m), sN )
and
W (φ−1(m)|f(m), sN ) = W (φ−1(m)|xN , sN ) =
∑
yN∈φ−1(m)
W (yN |xN , sN ) (7)
is the probability that the channel output lies in the decoding set φ−1(m) of the message m when the channel input
is f(m) = xN and the state sequence is sN .
The transmission rate of the code is given by
R =
1
N
log |M|
and the capacity of the deterministic code over the AVC W with respect to the average decoding error probability
is given by
C¯DC(W) = max
X
min
q∈P(S)
I(X;Yq) (8)
if C¯DC(W) > 0, where
Pr{X = x, Yq = y} = PX(x)Wq(y|x) (9)
with Wq given by (6). The capacity of the maximal decoding error probability is still unknown.
8Stochastic Code [31]. A stochastic code is specified by a pair (F, φ), where {F (m),m ∈ M} is a collection
of random sequences distributed over XN and φ is a deterministic mapping YN 7→ M. The maximal and average
decoding error probabilities are given by
λ(W, F, φ) = max
sN∈SN
λ(W, F, φ, sN ) and λ¯(W, F, φ) = max
sN∈SN
λ¯(W, F, φ, sN ) (10)
respectively, where
λ(W, F, φ, sN ) = max
m∈M
λm(W, F, φ, sN ), λ¯(W, F, φ, sN ) = 1|M|
∑
m∈M
λm(W, F, φ, sN ) (11)
with
λm(W, F, φ, sN ) = E[em(W, F, φ, sN )] and em(W, F, φ, sN ) = 1−W (φ−1(m)|F (m), sN ). (12)
Notice that W (φ−1(m)|F (m), sN ) is a discrete random function of F (m). To be precise,
Pr{W (φ−1(m)|F (m), sN ) = a} =
∑
xN∈XN :W (φ−1(m)|xN ,sN )=a
Pr{F (m) = xN}
for every a ∈ [0, 1], where W (φ−1(m)|xN , sN ) is given by (7).
The capacities of stochastic code over the AVCW with respect to the maximal and average decoding probabilities
are identical to C¯DC(W), i.e.
CSC(W) = C¯SC(W) = C¯DC(W). (13)
Random code [31]. A random code is specified by a pair of random encoder and decoder (F,Φ) distributed
over a collection of deterministic encoder and decoder pairs {(fg, φg) : g ∈ G}, where G is the index set of the
deterministic codes, whose size is related to the codeword length N . The maximal and average decoding error
probabilities are given by
λ(W, F,Φ) = max
sN∈SN
λ(W, F,Φ, sN ) and λ¯(W, F,Φ) = max
sN∈SN
λ¯(W, F,Φ, sN )
respectively, where
λ(W, F,Φ, sN ) = max
m∈M
λm(W, F,Φ, sN ), λ¯(W, F,Φ, sN ) = 1|M|
∑
m∈M
λm(W, F,Φ, sN ) (14)
with
λm(W, F,Φ, sN ) = E[em(W, F,Φ, sN )] and em(W, F,Φ, sN ) = 1−W (Φ−1(m)|F (m), sN ).
Notice that W (Φ−1(m)|F (m), sN ) is a discrete random function of (F,Φ). To be precise,
Pr{W (Φ−1(m)|F (m), sN ) = a} =
∑
g∈G:W (φ−1g (m)|fg(m),sN )=a
Pr{(F,Φ) = (fg, φg)}
for every a ∈ [0, 1], where W (φ−1g (m)|fg(m), sN ) is given by (7).
The capacities of random code over AVC W with respect to the maximal and average decoding probabilities are
identical. They follow that
CRC(W) = C¯RC(W) = max
X
min
q∈P(S)
I(X;Yq), (15)
9where {(X,Yq) : q ∈ P(S)} is a collection of random variables satisfying (9).
Remark 1: We present some remarks here to have a further explanation on the coding schemes and capacity
results.
• A popular technique to establish the standard channel coding theorem is the random coding scheme, but notice
that the random coding scheme is essentially different from the random code discussed here. In fact, the random
coding scheme would produce a deterministic code.
• A stochastic code is a special case of a random code, with the decoder being deterministic. To show this, let
(F, φ) be a stochastic code. Moreover, since the decoding error probabilities defined in (10) are only related
to the margin distributions of the random codewords (F (m),m ∈M), we assume that the random codewords
are mutually independent without loss of generality. Let {(fg, φ) : g ∈ G} be the collection of all possible
deterministic codes of length N , with the decoder being fixed. Then, the stochastic code is actually a random
code distributed over {(fg, φ) : g ∈ G}, such that
Pr{(F, φ) = (fg, φ)} =
∏
m∈M
Pr{F (m) = fg(m)}.
• Formulas (8), (13) and (15) give that the five capacities, except the one of deterministic code with respect to
the maximal decoding probability, are identical if they are all positive, i.e.
C¯DC(W) = C¯SC(W) = CSC(W) = C¯RC(W) = CRC(W)
if C¯DC(W) > 0. Notice that the precondition C¯DC(W) > 0 is important since it is possible that C¯DC(W) =
C¯SC(W) = CSC(W) = 0 while C¯RC(W) = CRC(W) > 0.
• When the random code is applied, there exists a third party providing extra information to tell the transmitter and
the legitimate receiver which pair of deterministic encoder and decoder is to be used before each transmission.
The information from the third party is called the CR of the random code. Throughout this paper, we assume
that the CR contains full information of both encoder and decoder, different from the settings in [16].
C. Typicality under state sequence
In the model of arbitrarily varying channel (AVC), the transition probability of the output sequence under a given
input sequence is related to the value of the state sequence. Therefore, to define the typical sequences over the
AVC, it is reasonable to take the state sequence into consideration. This subsection gives the definitions of typical
sequence under the state sequence, and lists some useful properties. These results provide new ideas dealing with
the reliable and secure transmission problems of AVC and AVWC. The new definitions originate from the letter
typical sequences defined in Chapter 1 of [13]. We first present the original definitions, followed by the new ones.
The original definitions
For any δ ≥ 0, the δ-letter typical set TNδ (PX) with respect to the probability mass function PX on X , is the
set of xN ∈ XN satisfying
| 1
N
N(a : xN )− PX(a)| ≤ δPX(a) for all a ∈ X ,
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where N(a : xN ) is the number of positions of xN having the letter a ∈ X . The jointly typical set TNδ (PXY ) with
respect to the joint probability mass function PXY and the conditionally typical set TNδ (PXY |xN ) of xN ∈ XN ,
are defined accordingly.
The new definitions
The propositions and corollaries claimed in this part will be briefly proved in Appendix A.
For any sN ∈ SN , a ∈ S and η > 0, denote by
I(a : sN ) = {1 ≤ i ≤ N, si = a} (16)
the collection of indices of components in sN whose values are a, and let
S(sN , η) = {a ∈ S, |I(a : sN )| > Nη|S| }. (17)
Furthermore, define the type of a given state sequence sN as a probability mass function PsN over S such that
PsN (a) = |I(a : sN )|/N
for a ∈ S.
Remark 2: The collection S(sN , η) defined in (17) contains the states which occur sufficiently many times in
the sequence sN . This collection is critical to the new definition of typical sequence. Roughly speaking, we are
only interested in the states from S(sN , η), and ignore the states outside.
Definition 2: The letter typical set T˜N [X, sN ]δ,η with respect to the random variable X under the state sequence
sN , is the set of xN ∈ XN such that PX(xi) > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and xI(a:sN ) ∈ Tµaδ (PX) for all a ∈ S(sN , η),
where xI(a:sN ) = (xi, i ∈ I(a : sN )) is a µa-subvector of xN and µa = |I(a : sN )|.
We provide an example below to help the reader have a clearer idea on the definition.
Example 2: Let S = X = {0, 1}, and X be the random variable satisfying
Pr{X = 0} = Pr{X = 1} = 1
2
.
Set η = 0.5 and δ = 0.12. Then we have the following conclusions.
• Suppose that N = 20, sN = 00000000001111111111 and xN = 00000111110000001111. It follows that
S(sN , η) = {0, 1}, I0 = I(0 : sN ) = {1, 2, ..., 10}, I1 = I(1 : sN ) = {11, 12, ..., 20}, xI0 = 0000011111 and
xI1 = 0000001111. This indicates that xI0 ∈ T 10δ (PX) and xI1 ∈ T 10δ (PX). Therefore, xN ∈ T˜N [X, sN ]δ,η.
• Suppose that N = 20, sN = 00000000001111111111 and xN = 00000111110000000111. It follows that
S(sN , η) = {0, 1}, I0 = I(0 : sN ) = {1, 2, ..., 10}, I1 = I(1 : sN ) = {11, 12, ..., 20}, xI0 = 0000011111 and
xI1 = 0000000111. This indicates that xI0 ∈ T 10δ (PX) and xI1 /∈ T 10δ (PX). Therefore, xN /∈ T˜N [X, sN ]δ,η.
• Suppose that N = 20, sN = 00000000000000000011 and xN = 00000000011111111111. It follows that
S(sN , η) = {0}, I0 = I(0 : sN ) = {1, 2, ..., 18} and xI0 = 000000000111111111. This indicates that
xI0 ∈ T 10δ (PX). Therefore, xN ∈ T˜N [X, sN ]δ,η. Notice that 1 /∈ S(sN , η), so there is no need to consider
the typicality of xI1 , where I1 = I(1 : sN ) = {19, 20}.
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Proposition 1: Suppose that X1, X2, ..., XN are N i.i.d. random variables with the same generic probability
mass function as that of X . For any given η > 0 and δ < mX , it follows that
Pr{XN ∈ T˜N [X, sN ]δ,η} > 1− 2−Nν1
for some ν1 > 0 unrelated to the length N and the state sequence sN , where mX = minx∈X :PX(x)>0 PX(x).
Definition 3: The letter typical set T˜N [YS , sN ]δ,η with respect to the random variables YS under the state sequence
sN is the set of yN ∈ YN such that PYsi (yi) > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and yI(a:sN ) ∈ T
µa
δ (PYa) for all a ∈ S(sN , η).
Interestingly, we have two definitions on typical sequences with respect to state sequence, namely Definitions 2
and 3. This, in fact, comes from the property of AVC. Definition 2 is for the typicality of the channel input, whose
distribution is independent of the state, while Definition 3 is for the output, whose distribution is related to the
state.
Proposition 2: Let Y N (sN ) be a random vector satisfying that
Pr{Y N (sN ) = yN} = ∏Ni=1 Pr{Ysi = yi}. (18)
Then for any yN ∈ T˜N [YS , sN ]δ,η, it follows that
2
−N [(1+δ)H¯P
sN
(YS)−η logmYS ] < Pr{Y N (sN ) = yN} < 2−N(1−δ−η)H¯PsN (YS),
where mYS = min(y,s)∈Y×S:PYs (y)>0 PYs(y) and PsN is the type of s
N .
Corollary 3: It is satisfied that |T˜N [YS , sN ]δ,η| < 2N [(1+δ)H¯PsN (YS)−η logmYS ].
Definition 4: The jointly typical set T˜N [XYS , sN ]δ with respect to (X,YS) under the state sequence sN is the
set of (xN , yN ) ∈ XN×YN satisfying PXYsi (xi, yi) > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and (xI(a:sN ), yI(a:sN )) ∈ T
µa
δ (PXYa)
for all a ∈ S(sN , η), where µa = |I(a : sN )|.
Proposition 4: (xN , yN ) ∈ T˜N [XYS , sN ]δ,η implies that xN ∈ T˜N [X, sN ]δ,η and yN ∈ T˜N [YS , sN ]δ,η.
Definition 5: For any given xN ∈ XN , the conditionally typical set of xN under the state sequence sN is defined
as
T˜N [XYS , sN |xN ]δ,η = {yN ∈ YN : (xN , yN ) ∈ T˜N [XYS , sN ]δ,η}.
Proposition 5: Let (XN , Y N (sN )) be a pair of random sequences with the conditional mass function
Pr{Y N (sN ) = yN |XN = xN} = ∏Ni=1 PYsi |X(yi|xi). (19)
Then for any (xN , yN ) ∈ T˜N [XYS , sN ]δ,η, it follows that
2
−N [(1+δ)H¯P
sN
(YS |X)−η logmXYS ] ≤ Pr{Y N (sN ) = yN |XN = xN} ≤ 2−N(1−δ−η)H¯PsN (YS |X),
where
mXYS = min
(x,y,s)∈X×Y×S:PX(x)Ws(y|x)>0
PX(x)Ws(y|x).
Corollary 6: Let Y N (sN ) be a random vector satisfying Formula (18). For any xN ∈ T˜N [X, sN ]δ,η, it follows
that
Pr{Y N (sN ) ∈ T˜N [XYS , sN |xN ]δ,η} < 2−N [I¯PsN (X;YS)−(2δ+η)H¯PsN (YS)+η logmXYS ].
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Proposition 7: Let (XN , Y N (sN )) be a pair of random sequences satisfying (19). For any xN ∈ T˜N [X, sN ]δ,η
and δ < mXYS , we have
Pr{Y N (sN ) ∈ T˜N [XYS , sN |xN ]2δ,η|XN = xN} > 1− 2−Nν2
for some ν2 > 0 unrelated to the length N and state sequence sN .
Remark 3: If Proposition 1 holds for some ν1 > 0, then it still holds if we decrease the value of ν1. That means
the value of ν1 can be sufficiently small, so can the value of ν2 in Proposition 7. In the subsequent sections, we
always treat ν1 and ν2 as constant real numbers, whose values are sufficiently small. Moreover, the property that
ν1 and ν2 are unrelated to sN , is of great significance. This indicates that Propositions 1 and 7 are possible to
hold simultaneously for all state sequences from SN .
III. COMMUNICATION MODELS AND MAIN RESULTS
This section presents the formal statements of the three communication models in this paper, and lists the main
results.
Subsection III-A provides the capacity results of AVC-CSR. Unlike the classic AVC, capacities of stochastic and
random codes over an AVC-CSR are identical. This model was first studied in [37]. We present the results here as
a preliminary to the discussion in Subsection III-C.
Subsection III-B discusses the secrecy capacity results of AVWC. Lower bounds on secrecy capacities of random
code and stochastic code over the AVWC are given. Stochastic code is a key technique to deal with the problem
of secure transmission over the wiretap channel [1]. It is also clear that random code does not provide a larger
secrecy capacity of a discrete memoryless wiretap channel than stochastic code. However, it is proved in [16] that
the secrecy capacity of random code over AVWC can be strictly larger than that of stochastic code. In fact, that
kind of situation happens only when the capacity of stochastic code over the main AVC is 0.
Subsection III-C discusses the secrecy capacity results of AVWC-CSR. It is proved that the secrecy capacity of
stochastic code over the AVWC-CSR is identical to that of random code. However, the value of secrecy capacity
is unknown in general. A lower bound on the secrecy capacity is given in that subsection.
When talking about the secrecy capacity, we always consider it with respect to the maximal decoding error
probability since it is more challenging than that of the average decoding error.
A. AVC with channel state sequence known at the receiver
This subsection introduces the capacity results of AVC-CSR. Just like the discussion of AVC in Subsection II-B,
we will discuss the capacities of different classes of coding schemes with respect to different criteria of decoding
error probabilities. Theorem 8 claims that the capacities of the following five cases are identical: 1) deterministic
code with respect to the average decoding error probability, 2) stochastic code with the average and 3) maximal
decoding error probabilities, and 4) random code with the average and 5) maximal decoding error probabilities. The
capacity of deterministic code with the maximal decoding error probability is unknown. Proposition 9 discusses the
positivity of it.
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Fig. 2. AVC-CSR, Arbitrarily varying channel with channel state sequence known at the receiver.
The definitions
Definition 6: (AVC-CSR, Arbitrarily Varying Channel with channel states known at the receiver) Just like the
AVC, an AVC-CSR is also specified by a finite collection W of transition probability matrices. The only difference
is that the receiver has access to the channel state sequence in the case of AVC-CSR. This would affect the definition
of the decoder. See Fig. 2.
Definition 7: (Deterministic code over AVC-CSR) Let an AVC-CSR W be given. A deterministic code over it is
specified by a pair of mappings (f, φ) with f : M 7→ XN and φ : YN × SN 7→ M. The maximal and average
decoding error probabilities are defined as
λCSR(W, f, φ) = max
sN∈SN
λCSR(W, f, φ, sN ) and λ¯CSR(W, f, φ) = max
sN∈SN
λ¯CSR(W, f, φ, sN )
respectively, where
λCSR(W, f, φ, sN ) = max
m∈M
λCSRm (W, f, φ, sN ), λ¯CSR(W, f, φ, sN ) =
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
λCSRm (W, f, φ, sN )
and
λCSRm (W, f, φ, sN ) = eCSRm (W, f, φ, sN ) = 1−W (φ−1(m, sN )|f(m), sN )
with the decoding set φ−1(m, sN ) given by
φ−1(m, sN ) = {yN ∈ YN : φ(yN , sN ) = m}.
The stochastic code and random code over AVC-CSR are defined accordingly.
The capacities
Let the capacities of the deterministic, stochastic and random codes over a given AVC-CSRW with respect to the
maximal and average decoding error probabilities be denoted by CCSR−DC(W), C¯CSR−DC(W), CCSR−SC(W)
C¯CSR−SC(W), CCSR−RC(W) and C¯CSR−RC(W), respectively. We have the following results.
Theorem 8: For every AVC-CSR W , the capacities of the deterministic, stochastic and random codes satisfy that
C¯CSR−DC(W) = CCSR−SC(W) = C¯CSR−SC(W) = CCSR−RC(W) = C¯CSR−RC(W) = max
X
min
s∈S
I(X;Ys),
where {(X,Ys) : s ∈ S} is a collection of random variables satisfying (1).
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The converse half of Theorem 8 is established by recalling the facts that the capacity of an AVC-CSR cannot
exceed that of the corresponding compound channel, and that the capacity of the compound channel specified by
W is maxX mins∈S I(X;Ys). The direct half of Theorem 8 was first established in [37], see also Problem 2.6.14
in [20]. We present the proof of the direct half in Section V-A as a preliminary to the proof of Theorem 15.
Remark 4: Comparing the results in Section II-B and that in Theorem 8, we see that the capacity of an AVC
may be strictly smaller than that of the corresponding AVC-CSR. For example, let
W =
{[
1 0
0 1
]
,
[
0 1
1 0
]}
.
It follows clearly that the capacity of AVCW is 0 even if random code is applied. On the other hand, the transmission
rate R = 1 can be achieved over AVC-CSR W by a deterministic code since the channel is totally noiseless when
the channel states are known at the receiver.
The capacity of deterministic code over the AVC-CSR with respect to the maximal decoding error probability,
i.e., the value of CCSR−DC(W), is still unknown. The following proposition gives the necessary and sufficient
condition ensuring the positivity of CCSR−DC(W).
Proposition 9: For every AVC-CSR W , the capacity CCSR−DC(W) of deterministic code with respect to the
maximal decoding error probability is positive if and only if there exist a pair of x, x′ ∈ X , such that for all channel
states s ∈ S, there exists y ∈ Y satisfying W (y|x, s) 6= W (y|x′, s).
The proof of Proposition 9 is given in Appendix B.
Remark 5: The capacity of deterministic code over an AVC-CSR with respect to the average decoding error can
be strictly larger than that of maximal decoding error. As an example, let S = X = {0, 1, 2}, Y = {0, 1} and
W =
{[1/3 2/3
2/3 1/3
1/2 1/2
]
,
[1/3 2/3
1/2 1/2
2/3 1/3
]
,
[1/2 1/2
1/3 2/3
2/3 1/3
]}
.
Proposition 9 claims that the capacity of deterministic code with the maximal decoding error is 0, while Theorem
8 claims that the capacity with respect to the average decoding error is (4− 2 log 3)/3.
B. AVWC with state sequence unknown at the receiver
This subsection gives a pair of lower bounds on the secrecy capacities of stochastic and random codes over
the AVWC with respect to the strong secrecy criterion. The formal definition of the general AVWC is given in
Definition 8, see also Remark 6 for the explanation of generality. Definitions 9 and 10 formulate the achievability
of stohastic code and random code, respectively. The corresponding lower bounds are given in Theorems 11 and
13, respectively.
The definitions
Definition 8: (AVWC, arbitrarily varying wiretap channel) An AVWC, depicted in Fig. 3, is specified by a pair
(W,V), where W = {Ws(y|x) : x ∈ X , y ∈ Y and s ∈ S} is a finite collection of transition probability matrices
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Fig. 3. AVWC, Arbitrarily varying wiretap channel with channel state sequence unknown at the receiver.
specifying the main AVC, and V = {Vs(z|x) : x ∈ X , z ∈ Z and s ∈ S} specifies the wiretap AVC. Let XN be
the input of the channels, and Y N (sN ) and ZN (sN ) be the outputs of main AVC and wiretap AVC, respectively,
when the state sequence is sN . We have
Pr{Y N (sN ) = yN |XN = xN} = W (yN |xN , sN ) =
N∏
i=1
Wsi(yi|xi) (20)
and
Pr{ZN (sN ) = zN |XN = xN} = V (zN |xN , sN ) =
N∏
i=1
Vsi(zi|xi). (21)
Remark 6: (Generality of Definition 8) In the definition of AVWC, we assume that the main AVC and the
wiretap AVC share the same state set, which is possible to be false in general. However, any communication model
of AVWC can be transformed into an equivalent model covered by Definition 8. To show this, consider an AVWC
(W,V) with W = {Ws : s ∈ S} and V = {Vt : t ∈ T }, where T is a finite state set of the wiretap AVC V . Given
the state sequences sN of the main AVC and tN of the wiretap AVC, the channel input and outputs satisfy that
Pr{Y N (sN ) = yN |XN = xN} = W (yN |xN , sN ) =
N∏
i=1
Wsi(yi|xi)
and
Pr{ZN (tN ) = zN |XN = xN} = V (zN |xN , tN ) =
N∏
i=1
Vti(zi|xi).
The equivalent AVWC (W˜, V˜) can be constructed with W˜ = {W˜s,t = Ws : (s, t) ∈ S × T } and V˜ = {V˜s,t = Vt :
(s, t) ∈ S ×T }, where the main AVC and the wiretap AVC share the same state set S ×T . This indicates that the
model of AVWC in Definition 8 is general.
Definition 9: (Secure achievability of stochastic code over AVWC) For any given AVWC (W,V), a non-negative
real number R is said to be achievable by stochastic code, with respect to the maximal decoding error probability
and the strong secrecy criterion, if for every  > 0, there exists a stochastic code (F, φ) over that AVWC such that
1
N
log |M| > R− , λ(W, F, φ) <  and max
sN∈SN
I(M ;ZN (sN )) < 
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when N is sufficiently large, where M is the source message uniformly distributed over the message set M and
ZN (sN ) is given by (21).
Definition 10: (Secure achievability of random code over AVWC) For any given AVWC (W,V), a non-negative
real number R is said to be achievable by random code, with respect to the maximal decoding error probability
and the strong secrecy criterion, if for every  > 0, there exists a random code code (F,Φ), such that
1
N
log |M| > R− , λ(W, F,Φ) <  and max
sN∈SN
I(M ;ZN (sN )|Φ) <  (22)
when N is sufficiently large, where M is the source message uniformly distributed over the message set M and
ZN (sN ) is given by (21).
The definition on secrecy of random code, namely maxsN∈SN I(M ;ZN (sN )|Φ) < , first introduced in [14], is
a bit different from that of stochastic code. To have a further explanation on the secrecy criterion, notice that
I(M ;ZN (sN )|Φ) = I(M ;ZN (sN )|Φ) + I(M ; Φ) = I(M ;ZN (sN ),Φ).
Therefore, the requirement of I(M ;ZN (sN )|Φ) <  implies that the eavesdropper is almost ignorant of the source
message, even if the full information of the random decoder is informed. It is reasonable to consider the case where
the information of the random decoder is exposed to the eavesdropper. According to the definition of random code,
the encoder knows exactly which deterministic decoder is used before each transmission. In consequence, when
H(Φ) is large enough, the specification of the random decoder Φ can serve as the secret key for secure transmission.
To be particular, we have Proposition 10 as follows.
Proposition 10: For any given AVWC (W,V), real numbers R < maxX minq∈P(S) I(X;Yq) and  > 0, there
exists a random code (F,Φ)such that
1
N
log |M| > R− , λ(W, F,Φ) <  and max
sN∈SN
I(M ;ZN (sN )) = 0
when N is sufficiently large, where M is the source message uniformly distributed over the message set M and
ZN (sN ) is given by (21).
Proof: It is a direct consequence of Theorem 1 in [23].
Remark 7: According to the proposition, when the transmission of CR is absolutely secure, the presence of the
wiretapper does not affect the secure transmission, and the capacity maxX minq∈P(S) I(X;Yq) of the main AVCW
can be achieved, no matter what the wiretap AVC V is. However, this requires the rate of CR to be sufficiently large.
The authors of [23] considered a more general case where the rate of CR was limited, and obtained a multi-letter
capacity.
Remark 8: When the random decoder Φ is deterministic, the random code is specialized as a stochastic code, in
which case
I(M ;ZN (sN )|Φ) = I(M ;ZN (sN )).
Therefore, Definition 10 is consistent with Definition 9.
Lower bounds on secrecy capacities
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Theorem 11: (Lower bound on the secrecy capacity of random code over AVWC) Given an AVWC (W,V), each
real number R satisfying
R ≤ max
U
[ min
q∈P(S)
I(U ;Yq)−max
s∈S
I(U ;Zs)] (23)
is achievable by random code with respect to the maximal decoding error probability and the strong secrecy criterion,
where U is an auxiliary random variable satisfying
Pr{U = u, Zs = z} =
∑
x∈X
Pr{U = u,X = x}Vs(z|x) (24)
and
Pr{U = u, Yq = y} =
∑
x∈X
Pr{U = u,X = x}Wq(y|x) (25)
with Wq given by (6). It suffices to let U be distributed over an alphabet U , whose size satisfies |U| ≤ |X |.
The proof of Theorem 11 is given in Subsection V-B.
Remark 9: When X is fixed, the mutual information I(X;Y ) is a convex function of the conditional probability
mass function PY |X . Therefore, it follows that maxs∈S I(U ;Zs) = maxq∈P(S) I(U ;Zq) for every fixed U , and
Formula (23) can be rewritten as
R ≤ max
U
[ min
q∈P(S)
I(U ;Yq)− max
q′∈P(S)
I(U ;Zq′)],
which coincides with the results in [16].
To establish the lower bound on secrecy capacity of stochastic code, we need the following proposition.
Proposition 12: (Theorem 2 in [16]) For any AVWC (W,V), its secrecy capacity of stochastic code and that of
random code are identical, if the capacity of stochastic code over the main AVC W is positive.
Combining Theorem 11 and Proposition 12 immediately yields the following theorem.
Theorem 13: (Lower bound on the secrecy capacity of stochastic code over AVWC) Given an AVWC (W,V),
every real number R satisfying
R ≤ max
U
[ min
q∈P(S)
I(U ;Yq)−max
s∈S
I(U ;Zs)] = max
U
[ min
q∈P(S)
I(U ;Yq)− max
q′∈P(S)
I(U ;Zq′)]
is achievable by the stochastic code with respect to the maximal decoding error probability and the strong secrecy
criterion, if the capacity of stochastic code over the main AVC W is positive. The random variable U has the same
features as that introduced in Theorem 11.
C. AVWC with channel state sequence known at the receiver
This subsection discusses the secrecy capacity of the AVWC-CSR with respect to the strong secrecy criterion.
Proposition 14 claims that the secrecy capacity of stochastic code is identical to that of random code. A lower
bound on the secrecy capacity is given in Theorem 15.
The definitions
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Fig. 4. AVWC-CSR, Arbitrarily varying wiretap channel with channel state sequence known at the receiver.
Definition 11: (AVWC-CSR, Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channel with channel states known at the receiver) Just
like the AVWC, an AVWC-CSR can also be specified by a pair (W,V). The only difference is that the receiver
has access to the channel state sequence in the case of AVWC-CSR. See Fig. 4.
Definition 12: (Stochastic code over AVWC-CSR) Let an AVWC-CSR (W,V) be given. A stochastic code over
it is specified by a pair (F, φ), where {F (m) : m ∈M} is a collection of random sequences distributed over XN
and φ : YN × SN 7→ M is a deterministic mapping.
A random code (F,Φ) over an AVWC-CSR is defined accordingly.
Definition 13: (Achievability of stochastic code over AVWC-CSR) For any given AVWC-CSR (W,V), a non-
negative real number R is said to be achievable by stochastic code, with respect to the maximal decoding error
probability and the strong secrecy criterion, if for every  > 0, there exists a stochastic code (F, φ) over that
AVWC-CSR such that
1
N
log |M| > R− , λCSR(W, F, φ) <  and max
sN∈SN
I(M ;ZN (sN )) < 
when N is sufficiently large, where M is the source message uniformly distributed over M and ZN (sN ) is given
by (21).
Definition 14: (Achievability of random code over AVWC-CSR) For any given AVWC-CSR (W,V), a non-
negative real number R is said to be achievable by random code, with respect to the maximal decoding error
probability and the strong secrecy criterion, if for every  > 0, there exists a random code (F,Φ) over that AVWC-
CSR such that
1
N
log |M| > R− , λCSR(W, F,Φ) <  and max
sN∈SN
I(M ;ZN (sN )|Φ) < 
when N is sufficiently large, where M is the source message uniformly distributed over M and ZN (sN ) is given
by (21).
A lower bound of the secrecy capacity
It has been shown in Subsection III-A that the capacity of stochastic code over an AVC-CSR is identical to
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that of random code. This directly yields that the secrecy capacity of stochastic code over an AVWC-CSR is also
identical to that of random code, as claimed in the following Proposition.
Proposition 14: For any AVWC-CSR (W,V), its capacity of stochastic code and that of random code are
identical.
The proof of Proposition 14 is the same as that of Proposition 12, and is hence omitted.
The following theorem gives a lower bound on the capacity of random code or stochastic code.
Theorem 15: (Lower bound on the secrecy capacity of stochastic code over AVWC-CSR) Given an AVWC-CSR
(W,V), every real number R satisfying
R ≤ max
U
[min
s∈S
I(U ;Ys)−max
s′∈S
I(U ;Zs′)]. (26)
is achievable by stochastic code with respect to the maximal decoding error probability and the strong secrecy
criterion, where U is an auxiliary random variable satisfying
Pr{U = u, Zs′ = z} =
∑
x∈X
Pr{U = u,X = x}Vs′(z|x) (27)
and
Pr{U = u, Ys = y} =
∑
x∈X
Pr{U = u,X = x}Ws(y|x). (28)
It suffices to let U be distributed over an alphabet U , whose size satisfies |U| ≤ |X |.
The proof of Theorem 15 is given in Subsection V-C.
IV. BASIC RESULTS FOR SECURE PARTITIONS
This section provides a general partitioning scheme to ensure secure transmission against wiretapping through
AVC. To be particular, Lemma 16 claims that the “good” codebook, introduced in Definition 15, can be obtained by
a randomly generating scheme. Lemmas 17 and 18 construct secure partitions over the “good” codebook to ensure
secure transmission. Those secure partitions can be readily used to prove the secrecy capacity results of AVWC
and AVWC-CSR. See Section V for details.
Lemmas on secure partitions
Definition 15: (“good” codebook) Suppose that C = {xN (l)}L′l=1 is a codebook of size L′ = 2NR
′
for R′ > 0.
Let X be a random variable distributed over the alphabet X . We further assume that δ, η and ν1 are real numbers
such that Proposition 1 holds. The codebook C is called “good” with respect to the random variable X if it follows
that
|T˜N (C, sN )| > (1− 2 · 2−Nν1)L′ for all sN ∈ SN ,
where T˜N (C, sN ) = C ∩ T˜N [X, sN ]δ,η is the collection of typical codewords with respect to the state sequence sN .
If a codebook is “good”, for any given state sequence sN , it follows that almost all the codewords are typical
with respect to sN . The following lemma claims that a “good” codebook can be constructed by a random scheme
with a high probability.
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Lemma 16: (The existence of “good” codebook) Let C = {XN (l)}L′l=1 be a random codebook of size L′ = 2NR
′
for R′ > 0, such that
Pr{C = C} =
L′∏
l=1
Pr{XN (l) = xN (l)} =
L′∏
l=1
N∏
i=1
PX(xi(l)) (29)
for any specific codebook C = {xN (l)}L′l=1, where PX represents the probability mass function of the random
variable X . Then the probability of C being “good” with respect to X is bounded by
Pr{C is “good”} > 1− 1,
where 1 → 0 as N →∞.
The proof of Lemma 16 is given in Appendix C.
Lemma 17: (Secure partition over “good” codebook) Let V = {Vs : s ∈ S} be an AVC, X be a random variable
over X , and ZS be a collection of random variables such that
Pr{Zs = z|X = x} = PZs|X(z|x) = Vs(z|x) (30)
for z ∈ Z , x ∈ X and s ∈ S. Suppose that a codebook C, containing L′ = 2NR′ codewords of length N , is “good”
with respect to X , where R′ > 0 is a constant real number. Then for any τ > 0,  > 0 and
L < L′ · 2−N [maxs∈S I(X;Zs)+τ ] = 2N [R′−maxs∈S I(X;Zs)−τ ],
there exists a secure equipartition {Cm}Lm=1 on it such that
I(M˜ ;ZN (C, sN )) < , (31)
for every sN ∈ SN , when N is sufficiently large. The random sequence ZN (C, sN ) is the output of the AVC when
the state sequence is sN and the channel input is XN (C). The random sequence XN (C) is uniformly distributed
over the codebook C. This indicates that
Pr{XN (C) = xN , ZN (C, sN ) = zN} = L′−1 ·
N∏
i=1
PZsi |X(zi|xi) = L′−1 ·
N∏
i=1
Vsi(z|x) (32)
for zN ∈ ZN , xN ∈ C and sN ∈ SN , where PZsi |X is given in (30). The random variable M˜ is the index of
subcode containing XN (C), i.e., XN (C) ∈ CM˜ .
Remark 10: It is clear that the random variable M˜ is uniformly distributed over [1 : L]. When applying Lemma
17 to a specific coding scheme, M˜ represents the source message, XN (C) is the channel input and ZN (C, sN ) is the
output of the wiretap channel under the state sequence sN . Therefore, Formula (31) indicates that the information
exposed to the eavesdropper is vanishing for every state sequence. Notice that the result of Lemma 17 is independent
of the main AVC. In fact, it will be shown in Section V that the main channel determines the upper bound of L′.
Lemma 17 can be readily extended to the following lemma.
Lemma 18: (Secure partition over “good” codebook with constraint on states) Let V = {Vs : s ∈ S} be an
AVC, X be a random variable over X , and ZS be a collection of random variables satisfying (30). Suppose that
a codebook C, containing L′ = 2NR′ codewords of length N , is “good” with respect to X , where R′ > 0 is a
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constant real number. Furthermore, let Sn, n ∈ N be a series of sequence collections such that Sn ⊆ Sn. If there
exists a real number Rd such that
Rd = lim sup
n→∞
max
sn∈Sn
I¯Psn (X;ZS),
then for any τ > 0,  > 0 and
L < L′ · 2−N [Rd+τ ] = 2N [R′−Rd−τ ],
there exists a secure partition {Cm}Lm=1 on it such that
I(M˜ ;ZN (C, sN )) < ,
for every sN ∈ SN , when N is sufficiently large, where M˜ and ZN (C, sN ) are the same as that introduced in
Lemma 17.
Lemma 18 can be used to deal with secure transmission over the communication model of AVWC with constrained
state sequence. See Subsection VI-C for details.
The proofs of Lemma 17 and Lemma 18 are similar. The proof of Lemma 17 is given below. The proof of
Lemma 18 is outlined in Appendix D.
Proof of Lemma 17
The proof is organized as the following three steps.
• Step 1 proves that
Pr{(XN (C), ZN (C, sN )) ∈ T˜N [XZS ]2δ,η} > 1− 2−Nν3 (33)
for every sN ∈ SN , where (XN (C), ZN (C, sN )) is a pair of random sequences satisfying (32) and ν3 is some
positive real number.
• Step 2 proves the existence of a mapping f : C 7→ [1 : L] such that
I(Mf ;Z
N (C, sN )) < 2 (34)
for every sN ∈ SN , where 2 → 0 as N →∞ and Mf = f(XN (C)). The proof is based on Lemma 19.
• The mapping f constructed in Step 2 will derive a secure partition on C. However, that partition is not
necessarily equally divided. Step 3 constructs a desired secure equipartition to establish (31) with the help of
Lemma 20.
Proof of Step 1. On account of the fact that XN (C) is uniformly distributed over the “good” codebook C (see
Definition 15), it follows that
Pr{XN (C) ∈ T˜N [X, sN ]δ,η} > 1− 2 · 2−Nν1
for every sN ∈ SN . Combining Proposition 7 (see also Remark 3), it follows that
Pr{(XN (C), ZN (C, sN )) ∈ T˜N [XZS ]2δ,η} > 1− 2 · 2−Nν1 − 2−Nν2 > 1− 2−Nν3 (35)
for every sN ∈ SN when ν3 is sufficiently small. The proof of Step 1 is completed. 
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Proof of Step 2. The key idea of the proof is based on Csiszár’s almost independent coloring scheme in [18].
The proof first realizes the parameters introduced in Lemma 19, which is (41). Then Lemma 19 claims the existence
of a mapping f : C 7→ [1 : L′] satisfying (44) and (45). Formula (34) is finally established from (45).
Lemma 19: (Lemma 3.1 in [33]) Let P be a set of probability mass functions on A. If there exist 0 < ε < 19
and l > 0 such that ∑
a:P (a)>l−1 P (a) ≤ ε (36)
for all P ∈ P , then for any positive integer k satisfying k log k ≤ 2l3 log(2|P|) , there exists a function f : A 7→ [1 : k]
such that ∑k
i=1 |P (f−1(i))− 1k | < 3ε
for all P ∈ P .
To realize the parameters introduced in Lemma 19, the main job is to construct P , which is a collection of
probability mass functions on the codebook C in our proof. The construction depends on a collection of subsets
B(C, sN ) of ZN for all sN ∈ SN , which are defined as
B(C, sN ) = B0(C, sN ) \ B1(C, sN ), (37)
where
B0(C, sN ) = {zN ∈ T˜N [ZS , sN ]2δ,η : Ψ(C, sN , zN ) < 2−Nν3/2} (38)
with
Ψ(C, sN , zN ) = Pr{XN (C) /∈ T˜N [XZS |sN , zN ]2δ,η|ZN (C, sN ) = zN},
and
B1(C, sN ) = {zN ∈ ZN : Pr{ZN (C, sN ) = zN} < 2−Nν3/2
N∏
i=1
PZsi (zi)}. (39)
Firstly, we claim a useful property of B(C, sN ) in (40). For every sN ∈ SN , Formulas (35) and (38) give
Pr{ZN (C, sN ) ∈ B0(C, sN )} > 1− 2−Nν3/2.
Meanwhile, it follows from (39) that
Pr{ZN (C, sN ) ∈ B1(C, sN )} < 2−Nν3/2
for every sN ∈ SN . Combining the last two formulas above gives
Pr{ZN (C, sN ) ∈ B(C, sN )} > 1− 2 · 2−Nν3/2 (40)
for every sN ∈ SN .
Secondly, with the help of B(C, sN ), the parameters introduced in Lemma 19 are realized as
A = C, ε = 2−Nν3/2,
l = 2N [R
′−maxs∈S I(X;Zs)−τ/2],
k = L < 2N [R
′−maxs∈S I(X;Zs)−τ ],
P = {PsN ,zN : sN ∈ SN , zN ∈ B(C, sN )} ∪ {P0},
(41)
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where
P0(x
N ) = Pr{XN (C) = xN} (42)
and
PsN ,zN (x
N ) = Pr{XN (C) = xN |ZN (C, sN ) = zN}. (43)
The verification that parameters in (41) satisfy the preconditions in Lemma 19, is given in Appendix E. Using
Lemma 19 with parameters from (41), there exists f : C 7→ [1 : k] satisfying that
k∑
i=1
|Pr{XN (C) ∈ f−1(i)} − 1
k
| =
k∑
i=1
|Pr{Mf = i} − 1
k
| < 3ε (44)
and
k∑
i=1
|Pr{XN (C) ∈ f−1(i)|ZN (C, sN ) = zN} − 1
k
| =
k∑
i=1
|Pr{Mf = i|ZN (C, sN ) = zN} − 1
k
| < 3ε (45)
for all sN ∈ SN and zN ∈ B(C, sN ), where Mf = f(XN (C)).
Finally, recall that L = k. Therefore, Formula (45) and the uniform continuity of entropy (see Lemma 1.2.7 in
[20]) gives
H(Mf |ZN (C, sN ) = zN ) ≥ logL− 3ε log L3ε
for all sN ∈ SN and zN ∈ B(C, sN ). Combining (40) and the formula above, it is satisfied that
H(Mf |ZN (C, sN )) > (1− 2ε)(logL− 3ε log L3ε )
for every sN ∈ SN . Since H(Mf ) ≤ logL, we arrive at
I(Mf ;Z
N (C, sN )) < 5ε logL− 3ε log(3ε)
for every sN ∈ SN . Formula (34) is established by substituting ε = 2−Nν3/4 and L < 2N [R′−maxs∈S I(X;Zs)−τ ]
into the formula above. The proof of Step 2 is completed. 
Proof of Step 3. The proof depends on the following lemma.
Lemma 20: (Lemma 4 in [11]) For any given codebook C, if the function f : C 7→ [1 : L] satisfies (44), then
there exists a partition {Cm}Lm=1 on C such that
1) |Cm| = L′L for all m ∈ [1 : L],
2) H(M˜ |Mf ) < 4
√
ε logL,
where M˜ is the index of the bin containing XN (C), i.e., XN (C) ∈ CM˜ .
From Lemma 20 and Formula (34), we have
I(M˜ ;ZN (C, sN )) ≤ I(M˜,Mf ;ZN (C, sN ))
= I(Mf ;Z
N (C, sN )) + I(M˜ ;ZN (C, sN )|Mf )
≤ I(Mf ;ZN (C, sN )) +H(M˜ |Mf ) ≤ 2 + 4
√
ε logL
(46)
for all sN ∈ SN . Since ε = 2−Nν3/4 and L < 2N [R′−maxs∈S I(X;Zs)−τ ], it follows that 4√ε logL→ 0 as N →∞.
Therefore, the rightmost side of Formula (46) is vanishing, accomplishing the proof of Step 3.
The proof of Lemma 17 is completed. 
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V. PROOFS OF THE MAIN THEOREMS
A. Proof of Theorem 8
This subsection proves the direct part of Theorem 8. In particular, it suffices to establish the capacity of
deterministic code over the AVC-CSR W with respect to the average decoding error probability. The other results
can be proved by standard technique in [30]. More precisely, we will prove that for any given random variables
(X,YS) satisfying (1), and any real numbers 0 < τ < mins∈S I(X;Ys) and  > 0, there exists a deterministic
code (f, φ) over that AVC-CSR such that
1
N
log |M| > min
s∈S
I(X;Ys)− τ and λ¯CSR(W, f, φ) < 
when the block length N is sufficiently large, where f :M 7→ XN and φ : YN × SN 7→ M.
We first introduce the coding scheme over the AVC-CSR, and then Lemma 21 claims that the coding scheme is
effective.
The coding scheme is designed as follows.
• Codebook Genaration. Let random variables (X,YS) and positive real number τ be given. Denote by
C = {XN (m)}Lm=1 a random codebook satisfying (29) with L′ = L, where 2N [mins∈S I(X;Ys)−τ ] < L <
2N [mins∈S I(X;Ys)−τ/2]. The final deterministic codebook used by the encoder is a sample value generated by
C.
• Encoder. Let M = [1 : L] be the message set, and the random variable M be the source message uniformly
distributed over M. Suppose that the codebook C = {xN (m)}Lm=1 is specified. The source message M is
then encoded as f(M) = xN (M).
• Decoder. The decoding scheme is constructed by an iteration scheme. Suppose that the codebook C =
{xN (m)}Lm=1 is specified. Choose a sufficiently small real number ν2 with ν2 < τ/8 such that Proposition 7
holds. For any given sN ∈ SN , the decoding process is manipulated as follows.
Denote D˜0(sN ) = D0(sN ) = ∅. For 1 ≤ m ≤ L, let
Dm(sN ) = T˜N [XYS , sN |xN (m)]2δ,η\D˜m−1(sN ),
if it is satisfied that
xN (m) ∈ T˜N [X, sN ]δ,η (47)
and
W (T˜N [XYS , sN |xN (m)]2δ,η/D˜m−1(sN )|xN (l), sN ) > 1− 2 · 2−Nν2 . (48)
Otherwise, set Dm(sN ) = ∅. After the value of Dm(sN ) is determined, let D˜m(sN ) = D˜m−1(sN )∪Dm(sN ).
Suppose the state sequence sN is given. The received sequence yN is decoded as φ(yN , sN ) = mˆ if yn ∈
Dmˆ(sN ). If yN is out of D˜L(sN ), declare a decoding error.
Remark 11: The coding scheme above is quite similar to that of DMCs except for the decoder. Here are some
notes for a further explanation. For each source message m, Dm(sN ) is the decoding set of m, and D˜m(sN )
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represents the union of the decoding sets of messages 1 to m. The decoding sets are related to sN since the
receiver knows the state sequence. Further, when sN is fixed, the decoding sets of all the messages are disjoint.
According to Formula (48), when Dm(sN ) is non-empty, the decoding error probability of message m under the
state sequence sN must be less than 2 · 2−Nν2 . Therefore, the decoding error probability of a source message is
either less than 2 · 2−Nν2 or exactly 1. Meanwhile, on account of (48), Dm(sN ) is non-empty only if the related
codeword xN (m) is typical under the state sequence sN . Finally, for a fixed message m, it is possible that its
decoding error probability is small under a certain state sequence, and is 1 under another.
The following lemma claims that the coding scheme above is effective.
Lemma 21: For any given codebook C = {xN (m)}Lm=1, let (f, φ) be the pair of encoder and decoder produced
by the coding scheme above. Denote by
e¯CSR(C, sN ) = e¯CSR(f, φ, sN ) = 1
L
L∑
m=1
[1−W (φ−1(m, sN )|f(m), sN )] (49)
the average decoding error probability of the coding scheme under the state sequence sN , where f(m) = xN (m)
and φ−1(m, sN ) = Dm(sN ) according to the coding scheme above. Then for any  > 0, it follows that
Pr
{
max
sN∈SN
e¯CSR(C, sN ) > 
}
< 3 (50)
where C is the random codebook satisfying (29) with L′ = L, and 3 → 0 as N →∞.
The proof of Lemma 21, similar to that of Theorem 5 in [32], is given in Appendix F.
B. Proof of Theorem 11
In this subsection, we provide the proof of Theorem 11, which claims a lower bound on the secrecy capacity of
random code over the AVWC (W,V). Let the collection of random variables {(X,Yq, Zs) : q ∈ P(S) and s ∈ S}
satisfy
Pr{X = x, Yq = y} = PX(x)Wq(y|x) (51)
and
Pr{X = x, Zs = z} = PX(x)Vs(z|x) (52)
with Wq given by (6). It suffices to prove that for any real numbers 0 < τ < minq∈P(S)(X;Yq)−maxs∈S I(X;Zs)
and  > 0, there exists a pair of random encoder and decoder (F,Φ) over that AVWC (W,V) such that
1
N
log |M| > min
q∈P(S)
(X;Yq)−max
s∈S
I(X;Zs)− τ, λ(W, F,Φ) <  and max
sN∈SN
I(M ;ZN (sN )|Φ) < , (53)
where M is the source message uniformly distributed over the message setM, and the random sequence ZN (sN ),
which is defined in (21), is the output of the wiretap AVC under the state sequence sN .
In the remainder of this subsection, we first introduce two preliminary lemmas, and then present the formal proof.
The preliminary lemmas.
The two lemmas introduced here are briefly described as follows. Lemma 22 claims the capacity of random code
over the AVC. However, knowing the capacity result is not enough for the proof of Theorem 11. The more important
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thing is that the capacity can be achieved by a random coding method, detailed in Remark 12. Lemma 23 comes
from the well-known elimination technique introduced by Ahlswede in [30], which was a key tool constructing a
stochastic code from a random code. The main conclusion is that it suffices to let the random code be distributed
over a collection of deterministic codes, whose size is quadratic to the codeword length.
Lemma 22: (Lemma 2.6.10 in [20]) Let an AVCW , a collection of random variables (X,YS) satisfying Formula
(1), and real numbers 0 < τ ′ < minq∈P(S)(X;Yq) and ′ > 0 be given. There exists a pair of random encoder
and decoder (F,Φ) distributed over a certain family of deterministic encoder-decoder pairs {(fg, φg) : g ∈ G} with
fg :M′ 7→ XN and φg : YN 7→ M′ such that
1
N
log |M′| > min
q∈P(S)
(X;Yq)− τ ′ and λ(W, F,Φ) < ′
when N is sufficiently large.
Remark 12: There exist several ways proving Lemma 22. In particular, the random codebook C = {F (l) =
XN (l)}L′l=1 constructed in the proof of [20] satisfies (29) with L′ = |M′|. This indicates that the codewords are
generated independently based on the probability mass function PX of the random variable X . In consequence,
Lemma 16 claims that the random codebook C is “good” with high probability.
Lemma 23: (Elimination technique) Suppose that (F,Φ) is a pair of random encoder and decoder of length N
over an AVC (resp. AVC-CSR) W , the size of whose message set is |M′| = 2NR′ for some constant real number
R′ > 0, such that
λ(W, F,Φ) < ′ resp. λCSR(W, F,Φ) < ′
for some ′ > 0. Let (Fi,Φi), 1 ≤ i ≤ N2 be a series of i.i.d. random encoder-decoder pairs with the same
probability mass function as that of (F,Φ). Then for any  > 4′, it follows that
Pr
{
max
m∈M
max
sN∈SN
[
N2∑
k=1
1
N2
em(W, Fk,Φk, sN )
]
< /2
}
> 1− 4
resp.
Pr
{
max
m∈M
max
sN∈SN
[
N2∑
k=1
1
N2
eCSRm (W, Fk,Φk, sN )
]
< /2
}
> 1− 4,
where 4 → 0 as N →∞.
Proof: The result of AVWC was given in [30]. The result of AVWC-CSR can be proved similarly.
Remark 13: Combining Lemma 22, Remark 12 and Lemma 23, it is concluded that there exists a series of
deterministic encoder-decoder pairs (fk, φk), 1 ≤ k ≤ N2 such that
max
m∈M
max
sN∈SN
[
N2∑
k=1
1
N2
λm(W, fk, φk, sN )
]
= max
m∈M
max
sN∈SN
[
N2∑
k=1
1
N2
em(W, fk, φk, sN )
]
< /2.
Let (F¯ , Φ¯) be a pair of random encoder and decoder uniformly distributed over {(fk, φk) : 1 ≤ k ≤ N2}. It follows
clearly that
λ(W, F¯ , Φ¯) < /2.
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The CR in this new random code is a random variable uniformly distributed over the index set [1 : N2]. Therefore,
the rate of the CR is 1N logN
2 → 0 as N → ∞. This indicates that the rate of CR can be dramatically smaller
than the rate of the message.
The formal proof.
The proof is divided into the following steps.
• Let N be a sufficiently large even integer and τ ′ be a sufficiently small positive real number. Step 1 constructs
a series of deterministic codes (fk, φk), 1 ≤ k ≤ N2/2, such that the codebooks Ck = {fk(m) : 1 ≤ m ≤ L′},
1 ≤ k ≤ N2/2 are “good” with respect to X and
max
m∈M
max
sN∈SN
[
N2/2∑
k=1
2
N2
λm(W, fk, φk, sN )
]
< , (54)
where fk : M′ 7→ XN , φk : YN 7→ M′, and the size L′ of the message set M′ satisfies that L′ >
2N [minq∈P(S) I(X;Yq)−τ
′].
• Step 2 constructs the random encoder and decoder (F¯ , Φ¯) satisfying (53).
Proof of Step 1. On account of Lemma 22, for any τ ′ > 0, there exists a pair of random encoder and decoder
(F,Φ) distributed over a certain family of deterministic codes {(fg, φg) : g ∈ G} with fg : M′ 7→ XN and
φg : YN 7→ M′ such that λ(W, F,Φ) < ′, where ′ = /5 and the size L′ of the message set M′ satisfies L′ >
2N [minq∈P(S) I(X;Yq)−τ
′]. Moreover, according to Remark 12, the random codebook C = {F (m) : 1 ≤ m ≤ L′}
satisfies (29).
Let (Fk,Φk), 1 ≤ k ≤ N2 be a series of i.i.d. random codes with the same probability mass function as that of
(F,Φ). Denote Ck = {Fk(m) : 1 ≤ m ≤ L′} and
ψ(Ck) =
0 if Ck is “good” ,1 otherwise.
It follows from Lemma 16 that
Pr{
N2∑
k=1
ψ(Ck) > N
2/2} < 21.
Combining Lemma 23, there exists a series of deterministic codes (fk, φk), 1 ≤ k ≤ N2 such that
max
m∈M
max
sN∈SN
[
N2∑
k=1
1
N2
λm(W, fk, φk, sN )
]
< /2
and
N2∑
k=1
ψ(Ck) ≤ N2/2,
where fk :M′ 7→ XN , φk : YN 7→ M′ and Ck = {fk(m) : m ∈M′}.
Let ψ(Ck) = 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ N2/2 without loss of generality, i.e., the first N2/2 (deterministic) codebooks are
“good”. It follows clearly that those codebooks satisfy Formula (54), completing the proof of Step 1. 
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Proof of Step 2. For every “good” codebook Ck, 1 ≤ k ≤ N2/2, Lemma 17 claims that if the value of L satisfies
that
2N [minp∈P(S) I(X;Yp)−maxS I(X;Zs)−3τ
′] < L′ · 2−N [maxS I(X;Zs)+2τ ′] < L < L′ · 2−N [maxS I(X;Zs)+τ ′], (55)
then there exists a secure partition {Ck,m}Lm=1 on it such that
max
sN∈SN
I(M˜k;Z
N (Ck, sN )) <  (56)
where M˜k is the index of subcode containing the random sequence XN (Ck) and (XN (Ck), ZN (Ck, sN )) is a pair
of random sequences satisfying (32) with C = Ck.
Now the random code can be defined as follows. For every given k and m, denote Ck,m = {xN (k,m, j) :
1 ≤ j ≤ L′/L}. Let K and J be random variables uniformly distributed over [1 : N2/2] and [1 : L′/L],
respectively. Moreover, K,J and the source message M are mutually independent. The random encoder is defined
as F¯ (M) = xN (K,M, J) and the random decoder is Φ¯ = φK . It follows clearly that the joint probability mass
function of the source message M and the wiretap AVC output ZN (sN ) is identical to that of M˜k and ZN (Ck, sN )
when fixing K = k. Therefore, for every sN ∈ SN we have
I(M ;ZN (sN )|Φ¯) ≤ I(M ;ZN (sN )|K)
=
2
N2
N2/2∑
k=1
I(M ;ZN (sN )|K = k)
=
2
N2
N2/2∑
k=1
I(M˜k;Z
N (C, sNk ))
< ,
(57)
where the first equality follows because M is independent of K and Φ¯ while Φ¯ is a function of K, and the last
inequality follows from Formula (56).
Furthermore, Formula (54) gives
λ(W, F¯ , Φ¯) = max
m∈M
max
sN∈SN
[
N2/2∑
k=1
2
N2
λm(W, fk, φk, sN )
]
< , (58)
and Formula (55) gives
1
N
log |M| > min
q∈P(S)
I(X;Yq)−max
z∈S
I(X;Zs)− τ (59)
by setting τ ′ < τ/3. Formula (53) is established by combining (57)-(59), The Theorem is proved. 
C. Proof of Theorem 15
After establishing the following lemma, the omitted proof of Theorem 15 is quite similar to that of Theorem 11
introduced in the previous subsection, see Remark 14 for more details.
Lemma 24: Let an AVC-CSR W , a collection of random variables (X,YS) satisfying (4), and two real numbers
0 < τ ′ < mins∈S I(X;Ys) and  > 0 be given. When the codeword length N is sufficiently large, there exists a
series of deterministic codebooks Ck, 1 ≤ k ≤ N2 having the following properties.
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• all the codebooks are “good” with respect to X;
• the size L′ of each codebook satisfies L′ > 2N(mins∈S I(X;Ys)−τ
′);
• Let (fk, φk) be the pair of encoder and decoder derived from Ck according to the coding scheme in Subsection
V-A. The decoding error probability satisfies
max
m∈M′
max
sN∈SN
[
N2∑
k=1
1
N2
eCSRm (W, fk, φk, sN )
]
< /2, (60)
where M′ is the message set.
The proof below shows an important technique constructing a random code with a vanishing maximal decoding
error from an arbitrary code with a vanishing average decoding error.
Proof of Lemma 24. Combining Lemmas 16 and 21, it is concluded that there exists a “good” codebook C such
that
max
sN∈SN
e¯CSR(C, sN ) < ,
where e¯CSR(C, sN ) is given by (49), and the size of the codebook satisfies L′ > 2N(mins∈S I(X;Ys)−τ ′). Denote
by (f, φ) the pair of encoder and decoder derived from C by the coding scheme introduced in Subsection V-A,
with the message set M′ = [1 : L′]. Let Π be the collection of all possible permutations on [1 : L′]. For any
pi ∈ Π, let (fpi, φpi) be the encoder-decoder pair such that fpi(m) = f(pi(m)) for m ∈ [1 : L′] and φpi(yN , sN ) =
pi−1(φ(yN , sN )) for (yN , sN ) ∈ YN × SN . Let (F,Φ) be the random code uniformly distributed over {(fpi, φpi) :
pi ∈ Π}. It follows clearly that
λCSR(W, F,Φ) < .
Furthermore, Lemma 23 claims the existence of an encoder-decoder series (fk, φk), 1 ≤ k ≤ N2 satisfying (60).
Finally, codebooks Ck = {fk(m) : m ∈ M′}, 1 ≤ k ≤ N2 are “good” since they are all permutations of C. The
lemma is proved. 
Remark 14: Lemma 24 constructs a collection of “good” codebooks satisfying (60). With this, we can skip the
proof of Step 1 in Section V-B and jump to Step 2 directly.
VI. DISCUSSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This section presents some more detailed discussions on AVWC and AVWC-CSR. Subsection VI-A gives a
pair of simple upper bounds on secrecy capacities of AVWC and AVWC-CSR. Subsection VI-B introduces the
concepts of less noisy AVCs. Three types of less noisiness are given there. With those definitions, we determine
the secrecy capacity of AVWC with severely less noisiness, and the secrecy capacity of AVWC-CSR with strongly
less noisiness. Subsection VI-C studies the models of AVWC with constrained cost or types on state sequence,
and establishes a pair of lower bounds on the secrecy capacities, which include the result in Subsection III-B as a
special case.
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A. Simple upper bounds on capacities of AVWC and AVWC-CSR
This subsection introduces a pair of upper bounds on the secrecy capacities of stochastic code over the AVWC
and AVWC-CSR, with respect to the maximal decoding error probability, which is detailed in Lemma 25. Moreover,
Example 3 shows that the upper bounds are different from the corresponding lower bounds in Section III.
Lemma 25: The secrecy capacity CAVWC−SCs (W,V) reps. CAVWC−CSR−SCs (W,V) of stochastic code over a
given AVWC (W,V) resp. AVWC-CSR (W,V) must satisfy that
CAVWC−SCs (W,V) ≤ min
q∈P(S),s∈S
max
Uq,s
[I(Uq,s;Yq)− I(Uq,s;Zs)]
resp.
CAVWC−CSR−SCs (W,V) ≤ min
s,s′∈S
max
Us,s′
[I(Us,s′ ;Ys)− I(Us,s′ ;Zs′)],
where W = {Ws : s ∈ S} and V = {Vs : s ∈ S} are a pair of transition matrix collections, {(Uq,s, Yq, Zs) : q ∈
P(S), s ∈ S} is a collection of random variables satisfying (24) and (25), and {(Us,s′ , Ys, Zs′) : s, s′ ∈ S} is a
collection of random variables satisfying (27) and (28).
The upper bound on the secrecy capacity of AVWC was established in [16]. We present the proof in Appendix
G as a preliminary to the proof of Proposition 26 in Subsection VI-B. The upper bound of AVWC-CSR can be
proved similarly, and is hence omitted.
Example 3: It is clear that the upper bounds introduced in this subsection differ from the corresponding lower
bounds in Subsections III-B and III-C. As a simple example, consider an AVWC-CSR (W,V), depicted in Fig. 5,
with W = {W1,W2} and V = {V1, V2}, where
W1 =
[
1 0
3p/2 1− 3p/2
]
,W2 =
[
1− 3p/2 3p/2
0 1
]
and V1 = V2 =
[
1− p p
p 1− p
]
.
The upper bound and lower bound of the secrecy capacity is shown in Fig. 6.
B. Capacities of less noisy AVWC and AVWC-CSR
Example 3 shows that the upper bounds introduced in Subsection VI-A differ from the corresponding lower
bounds established in Subsections III-B and III-C. Therefore, the secrecy capacities of the general AVWC and
AVWC-CSR are unknown. In this subsection, we introduce the concepts of degraded AVCs and less noisy AVCs,
and establish the secrecy capacities of AVWC and AVWC-CSR in Propositions 26 and 27, when the main AVC is
less noisy than the wiretap AVC.
Definitions of degraded AVCs and less noisy AVCs.
The concepts of degraded AVCs and less noisy AVCs come from those of DMCs. When considering DMCs,
we would call DMC V : X 7→ Z is a degraded version of DMC W : X 7→ Y , if there exists a transition matrix
V ′ : Y 7→ Z such that
V (z|x) =
∑
y∈Y
W (y|x)V ′(z|y)
for x ∈ X and z ∈ Z .
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Fig. 5. Channel model of the AVWC-CSR in Example 3.
Fig. 6. Lower and upper bounds on the secrecy capacity of the AVWC-CSR in Example 3.
A more general relationship between two DMCs is less noisy channels. To be precise, DMC W is said to be
less noisy than DMC V if
I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z)
holds for any (U,X, Y, Z) satisfying
Pr{U = u,X = x, Y = y} = Pr{U = u,X = x}W (y|x)
and
Pr{U = u,X = x, Z = z} = Pr{U = u,X = x}V (z|x).
In general, if DMC V is a degraded version of DMC W , then DMC W is less noisy than DMC V .
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Based on the relationships between DMCs, three intuitive definitions on the relationship of degradation between
AVCs V = {Vs(z|x) : x ∈ X , z ∈ Z, s ∈ S} and W = {Ws(y|x) : x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, s ∈ S} are given as follows.
• AVC V is said to be a weakly degraded version of AVC W if DMC Vs is a degraded version of DMC Ws
for every s ∈ S.
• AVC V is said to be a strongly degraded version of AVC W if DMC Vs′ is a degraded version of DMC Ws
for every s′, s ∈ S.
• AVC V is said to be a severely degraded version of AVC W if DMC Vq′ is a degraded version of DMC Wq
for every q′, q ∈ P(S).
Example 4: It is clear that severe degradation implies strong degradation, while strong degradation implies weak
degradation. However, the opposite is not true. To show this, let
W1 =
{[
1 0
0 1
]
,
[
1/3 2/3
2/3 1/3
]}
,V1 =
{[
1/4 3/4
3/4 1/4
]
,
[
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
]}
and
W2 =
{[
1 0
0 1
]
,
[
0 1
1 0
]}
,V2 =
{[
1/3 2/3
2/3 1/3
]
,
[
2/3 1/3
1/3 2/3
]}
.
It follows that V1 is a weakly degraded version of W1, while the strong degradation is not true. Meanwhile, V2 is
a strongly degraded version of W2, while the severe degradation is not true.
Similarly, we have the definitions of less noisy AVCs as follows.
• AVC W is said to be weakly less noisy than AVC V if DMC Ws is less noisy than DMC Vs for every s ∈ S.
• AVC W is said to be strongly less noisy than AVC V if DMC Ws′ is less noisy than DMC Vs for every
s′, s ∈ S.
• AVC W is said to be severely less noisy than of AVC V if DMC Wq′ is less noisy than DMC Vq for every
q′, q ∈ P(S).
Based on the definitions above, we have some direct results. First, severely less noisiness implies strongly less
noisiness, and strongly less noisiness implies weakly less noisiness. Second, if AVC V is a weakly degraded version
of AVC W , then AVC W is weakly less noisy than AVC V . Similar results hold respectively for strong and severe
cases.
The capacities.
In the rest of this subsection, we determine the secrecy capacity of the AVWC where the main AVC is severely
less noisy than the wiretap AVC, and the secrecy capacity of the AVWC-CSR where the main AVC is strongly
less noisy than the wiretap AVC. The capacity of weakly less noisiness is not discussed here, but it is meaningful
when considering the capacity results of AVWC with channel states known at the transmitter, which is beyond the
topic of this paper.
Proposition 26: (Secrecy capacity of severely less noisy AVWC) Given an AVWC (W,V), its secrecy capacity
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of stochastic code with respect to the maximal decoding error probability and strong secrecy criterion is
CAVWC−SCs (W,V) = max
X
min
q∈P(S),s∈S
[I(X;Yq)− I(X;Zs)], (61)
if the capacity of stochastic code over the main AVC W is positive, and the main AVC W is severely less noisy
than the wiretap AVC V , where (X,Yq, Zs) satisfies
Pr{Yq = y|X = x} = Wq(y|x),Pr{Zs = z|X = x} = Vs(y|x), (62)
and Wq is given by (6).
Proposition 27: (Secrecy capacity of strongly less noisy AVWC-CSR) Given an AVWC-CSR (W,V), its secrecy
capacity of stochastic code with respect to the maximal decoding error probability and strong secrecy criterion is
CAVWC−CSR−SCs (W,V) = max
X
min
s,s′∈S
[I(X;Ys)− I(X;Zs′)],
if the main AVC W is strongly less noisy than the wiretap AVC V , where (X,Ys, Zs′) satisfies
Pr{Ys = y|X = x} = Ws(y|x) and Pr{Zs′ = z|X = x} = Vs′(y|x).
The proofs of Propositions 26 and 27 are similar. We only give the proof of Propositions 26 in Appendix H.
Example 5: In this example, we will compare the secrecy capacities of AVWC and AVWC-CSR where the main
AVCW is severely less noisy than the wiretap AVC V . Both of the wiretap channel models are specified by (W,V),
depicted in Fig. 7, with W = {W1,W2} and V = {V1, V2}, where S = {1, 2},X = {0, 1}, Y = Z = {0, e, 1},
W1 =
[
1 0 0
0 q 1− q
]
,W2 =
[
1− q q 0
0 0 1
]
and V1 = V2 =
[
1− p 0 p
p 0 1− p
]
.
It follows clearly that the wiretap AVC V is a strongly degraded version of the main AVC W , for every p and q.
Moreover, by the similar way of proving Property 2 in Theorem 3 of [8], one can conclude that the main AVC
W is severely less noisy than the wiretap AVC V when q ≤ 2p(1− p). In this case, the secrecy capacities of the
corresponding AVWC and AVWC-CSR are given in Fig. 8. Therefore, this example shows that the secrecy capacity
of an AVWC-CSR can be strictly larger than that of the corresponding AVWC.
C. AVWC with constrained state sequence
In the previous sections, we always assume that the state sequence sN is able to run over all the possible values
from SN . In this subsection, we consider the cases where the state sequence is constrained by cost or types. All
the results are about AVWC. The results of AVWC-CSR are not considered here since the capacity of AVC-CSR
with constrained states is not established.
AVWC with constrained cost on state sequence.
Definition 16: (Cost of the state sequence) Let c : S 7→ R∗ be a non-negative function on the state set S. We
define the average cost of a state sequence sN as
c(sN ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
c(si). (63)
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Fig. 7. Channel model of main AVC and wiretap AVC in Example 5.
Fig. 8. The secrecy capacities of the AVWC and AVWC-CSR in Example 5 with q = 2p(1− p).
Definition 17: (Secure achievability of random code over the AVWC with cost constraint on states) For any given
AVWC (W,V), a non-negative real number R is said to be achievable by random code, with respect to the maximal
decoding error probability and the strong secrecy criterion, over that AVWC with cost constraint Λ > 0 on the
states, if for every  > 0, there exists a random code (F,Φ) over that AVWC such that
1
N
log |M| > R− , λ(W, F,Φ,Λ) <  and max
sN∈SN :c(sN )≤Λ
I(M ;ZN (sN )|Φ) <  (64)
when N is sufficiently large, where M is the source message uniformly distributed over the message set M,
ZN (sN ) is given by (21) and
λ(W, F,Φ,Λ) = max
sN∈SN :c(sN )≤Λ
λ(W, F,Φ, sN ) (65)
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with λ(W, F,Φ, sN ) given by (14).
Theorem 28: (Lower bound on the secrecy capacity of random code over AVWC with cost constraint on states)
Given an AVWC (W,V) with cost constraint Λ > 0 on the states, each real number R satisfying
R ≤ max
U
[ min
q∈P(S,Λ)
I(U ;Yq)− max
q′∈P(S,Λ)
I¯q′(U ;ZS)] (66)
is achievable by random code, where {(U, Yq, Zs) : q ∈ P(S), s ∈ S} is a collection of random variables satisfying
(24) and (25), I¯q′ is given by (2), and
P(S,Λ) = {q ∈ P(S) : c(q) ≤ Λ} (67)
with
c(q) =
∑
s∈S
c(s)q(s). (68)
The proof of Theorem 28 is outlined at the end of this subsection.
Remark 15: Let cM = maxs∈S c(s). Then, when Λ ≥ cM , we have P(S,Λ) = P(S). In this case, the bound
formulated in (66) is specialized as
R ≤ maxU [minq∈P(S,Λ) I(U ;Yq)−maxq′∈P(S,Λ) I¯q′(U ;ZS)]
= maxU [minq∈P(S) I(U ;Yq)−maxq′∈P(S) I¯q′(U ;ZS)]
= maxU [minq∈P(S) I(U ;Yq)−maxs∈S I(U ;Zs)].
Therefore, Theorem 28 includes Theorem 11 as a special case.
AVWC with constrained types on state sequence.
By the definition in (63), the cost of a state sequence sN is totally determined by its type PsN . To be precise,
we have
c(sN ) = c(PsN ),
where c(PsN ) is given by (68). On account of that, Equations (64) and (65) in Definition 17 can be rewritten as
1
N
log |M| > R− , λ(W, F,Φ,Λ) <  and max
sN∈SN :PsN∈P(S,Λ)
I(M ;ZN (sN )) < 
and
λ(W, F,Φ,Λ) = max
sN∈SN :PsN∈P(S,Λ)
λ(W, F,Φ, sN ).
where P(S,Λ) is given in (67). This indicates the definition of achievability is totally characterized by a collection
P(S,Λ) of probability mass functions on S. Aroused by this property, we have a slightly more general definition
on AVWC with constrained state sequence as follows.
Definition 18: (Secure achievability of random code over AVWC with general constraint on states) For any given
AVWC (W,V), a non-negative real number R is said to be achievable by random code, with respect to the maximal
decoding error probability and the strong secrecy criterion, over that AVWC with states constrained by P ⊆ P(S),
if for every  > 0, there exists a random code (F,Φ) over that AVWC such that
1
N
log |M| > R− , λ(W, F,Φ,P) <  and max
sN∈SN :PsN∈P
I(M ;ZN (sN )|Φ) < 
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when N is sufficiently large, where where M is the source message uniformly distributed over the message setM,
ZN (sN ) is given by (21), and
λ(W, F,Φ,P) = max
sN∈SN :PsN∈P
λ(W, F,Φ, sN )
with λ(W, F,Φ, sN ) given by (14).
The following result can be proved with little effort.
Proposition 29: (Lower bound on the secrecy capacity of random code over AVWC with general constraint on
states) Given an AVWC (W,V) with channel states constrained by P, each real number R satisfying
R ≤ max
U
[ inf
q∈P
I(U ;Yq)− sup
q′∈P
I¯q′(U ;ZS)]
is achievable by random code, where {(U, Yq, Zs) : q ∈ P(S), s ∈ S} is a collection of random variables satisfying
(24) and (25).
As an extremely special case, when P = {q} has only one single element, the model is specialized as the model
in [43]. In that case, it follows that
Corollary 30: Given an AVWC (W,V) with channel states constrained on {q}, each real number R satisfying
R ≤ max
U
[I(U ;Yq)− I¯q(U ;ZS)]
is achievable by random code, where {(U, Yq, Zs) : q ∈ P(S), s ∈ S} is a collection of random variables satisfying
(24) and (25).
Remark 16: We should point out that the result in Corollary 30 does not cover the results in [43]. That’s because
the capacity in [43] is with respect to semantic secrecy criterion, which is severer than the strong secrecy criterion
in this paper.
Proof of Theorem 28.
It suffices to prove that for any collection of random variables {(X,Yq, Zs) : q ∈ P(S) and s ∈ S} satisfying
(51) and (52), and real numbers 0 < τ < minq∈P(S,Λ)(X;Yq)−maxq′∈P(S,Λ) I¯q′(X;ZS) and  > 0, there exists
a pair of random encoder and decoder (F,Φ) over that AVWC (W,V) such that
1
N
log |M| > min
q∈P(S,Λ)
(X;Yq)− max
q′∈P(S,Λ)
I¯q′(X;ZS)− τ,
λ(W, F,Φ,Λ) < 
and
max
sN :PsN∈P(S,Λ)
I(M ;ZN (sN )|Φ) < ,
where M is the source message uniformly distributed over the message set M, the random sequence ZN (sN ),
which is defined in (21), is the output of wiretap AVC under the state sequence sN , P(S,Λ) is give by (67),
λ(W, F,Φ,Λ) is given by (65), and I¯q′ is given by (2).
The proof of Theorem 28 is similar to that of Theorem 11 in Subsection V-B. We first introduce a preliminary
lemma and then present the outline of proof.
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Lemma 31: Let an AVC W with cost constraint Λ on states, a collection of random variables (X,YS) satisfying
Formula (1), and real numbers 0 < τ ′ < minq∈P(S,Λ)(X;Yq) and ′ > 0 be given. There exists a pair of random
encoder and decoder (F,Φ) distributed over a certain family of deterministic encoder-decoder pairs {(fg, φg) : g ∈
G} with fg :M′ 7→ XN and φg : YN 7→ M′ such that
1
N
log |M′| > min
q∈P(S,Λ)
(X;Yq)− τ ′ and λ(W, F,Φ,Λ) < ′
when N is sufficiently large, where λ(W, F,Φ,Λ) is given by (65) and {(X,Yq) : q ∈ P(S)} is a collection of
random variables satisfying (9).
Proof: It is a direct corollary of Theorem 3.1 in [21].
Remark 17: Lemma 31 is an extension of Lemma 22. The proofs of those two lemmas are similar. In other
words, the random codebook C = {F (l) = XN (l)}L′l=1 constructed in the the proof of Theorem 3.1 in [21] (which
is more general than Lemma 31 in this paper) also satisfies (29) with L′ = |M′|, i.e., the codewords are generated
independently based on the probability mass function PX of the random variable X . Therefore, Lemma 16 claims
that the random codebook C is “good” with high probability.
The proof of Theorem 28, similar to that of Theorem 11 in Subsection V-B, is outlined as follows.
Similar to Step 1 of the proof in Subsection V-B, Lemma 31, Remark 17 and Lemma 23 claim that there exists
a series of deterministic codes (fk, φk), 1 ≤ k ≤ N2/2, such that the codebooks Ck = {fk(m) : 1 ≤ m ≤ L′},
1 ≤ k ≤ N2/2 are “good” with respect to X and
max
m∈M
max
sN :PsN∈P(S,Λ)
[
N2/2∑
k=1
2
N2
em(W, fk, φk, sN )
]
< ,
where fk :M′ 7→ XN , φk : YN 7→ M′, and the size L′ of the message set M′ satisfies that
L′ > 2N [minq∈P(S,Λ) I(X;Yq)−τ
′].
Let SN = {sN : PsN ∈ P(S,Λ)} and
Rd = lim sup
n→∞
max
sn∈Sn
I¯Psn (X;ZS) = max
q′∈P(S,Λ)
I¯q′(X;ZS).
For every “good” codebook Ck, 1 ≤ k ≤ N2/2, Lemma 18 claims that if the value of L satisfies that
2N [minq∈P(S,Λ)(X;Yq)−maxq′∈P(S,Λ) I¯q′ (X;ZS)−3τ
′] < L′ · 2−N [Rd+2τ ′] < L < L′ · 2−N [Rd+τ ′],
then there exists a secure partition {Ck,m}Lm=1 on it such that
max
sN∈SN
I(M˜k;Z
N (Ck, sN )) = max
sN :PsN∈P(S,Λ)
I(M˜k;Z
N (Ck, sN )) < ,
where M˜k is the index of subcode containing the random sequence XN (Ck), and (XN (Ck), ZN (Ck, sN )) is a pair
of random sequence satisfying (32) with C = Ck.
With the secure partitions {Ck,m}Lm=1 over the “good” codebooks Ck, 1 ≤ k ≤ N2/2, the theorem is finally
established by the coding scheme introduced in Step 2 of the proof in Subsection V-B. 
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VII. CONCLUSION
This paper discusses the secrecy capacity results of general AVWC and AVWC-CSR. Lower bounds on the
secrecy capacities of stochastic code and random code with respect to the maximal decoding error probability and
strong secrecy criterion are given. It is concluded that the secrecy capacity of stochastic code over an AVWC may
be strictly smaller than that of random code, but this situation happens only when the capacity of stochastic code
over the main AVC is 0. Meanwhile, the secrecy capacity of stochastic code over AVWC-CSR is identical to that
of random code in general.
The secrecy capacities of general AVWC and AVWC-CSR are unknown. However, we determine the secrecy
capacity of AVWC where the main AVC is severely less noisy than the wiretap AVC, and that of AVWC-CSR
where the main AVC is strongly less noisy than the wiretap AVC.
A new secure partitioning scheme, based on Csiszár’s almost independent coloring scheme, is proposed, which
serves as a fundamental tool to prove the secrecy capacity results in this paper. This powerful scheme can be used
to ensure secure transmission against wiretapping through AVC with or without constraint on state sequence.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS ON TYPICALITY
This appendix gives the proofs on the properties of typicality with respect to the state sequence introduced in
Subsection II-C. Since the proofs are quite similar to those in Chapter 1 of [13], we only provide the outlines here.
Proof of Proposition 1. On account of Theorem 1.1 in [13], there exists a series of σa > 0, a ∈ S such that
Pr{XN ∈ T˜N [X, sN ]δ,η} =
∏
a∈S(sN ,δ,η)
Pr{XI(a:sN ) ∈ Tµaδ (PX)} >
∏
a∈S(sN ,δ,η)
(1− 2−Nσa) > 1− 2−Nν1
for some ν1 > 0, where I(a : sN ) is given by (16), S(sN , η) is given by (17), µa = |I(a : sN )| and mYS =
min(y,s)∈Y×S:PYs (y)>0 PYs(y). The property that ν1 is independent of N and s
N , comes from the fact σa is only
related to mX = minx∈X :PX(x)>0 PX(x), δ and η. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The proposition follows because for every yN ∈ T˜N [YS ]δ,η, it is satisfied that
2−µa(1+δ)H(Ya) ≤ Pr{YI(a:sN )(sN ) = yI(a:sN )} ≤ 2−µa(1−δ)H(Ya)
for a ∈ S(sN , η), and
2µa logmYS ≤ Pr{YI(a:sN )(sN ) = yI(a:sN )} ≤ 1
for a /∈ S(sN , η). 
Corollary 3 is a direct consequence of Proposition 2, Proposition 4 is obtained immediately from definitions,
Proposition 5 can be proved similarly to Proposition 2, Corollary 6 is a direct consequence of Proposition 2 and
Corollary 3, and Proposition 7 can be proved similarly to Proposition 1. The proofs are completed. 
39
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9
This appendix establishes the necessary and sufficient condition of positivity on the capacity of deterministic
code over the AVC-CSR W with respect to the maximal decoding error probability. To be particular, we would
prove that the capacity is positive if and only if there exist a pair of x, x′ ∈ X , such that for all channel states
s ∈ S, there exists y ∈ Y satisfying W (y|x, s) 6= W (y|x′, s).
Necessity. We prove this by contradiction. for every pair of x and x′, assume that there exists s(x, x′) ∈ S, such
that W (y|s(x, x′), x) = W (y|s(x, x′), x′) for all y ∈ Y . Suppose that (f, φ) is a deterministic code of length N
over the AVC-CSR W with positive transmission rate. This indicates that the size of the message set M is at least
two. We would prove that the maximal decoding error probability λCSR(W, f, φ) ≥ 12 .
If λCSRm (W, f, φ) ≥ 12 for all m ∈ M, then the proof has been finished. Therefore, we can assume that
λCSRm0 (W, f, φ) =  < 12 for some m0 ∈M. Let the codeword of the message m0 be f(m0) = xN (0). Then, for any
m1 ∈M other than message m0, set xN (1) = f(m1) and choose the state sequence sN with si = s(xi(0), xi(1))
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . It follows that W (yN |xN (0), sN ) = W (yN |xN (1), sN ) for every yN ∈ YN . This indicates that
λCSRm1 (W, f, φ) ≥ λCSRm1 (W, f, φ, sN )
= 1−W (φ−1(m1)|xN (1), sN )
= 1−W (φ−1(m1)|xN (0), sN )
≥ W (φ−1(m0)|xN (0), sN )
= 1− λCSRm0 (W, f, φ, sN )
≥ 1− λCSRm0 (W, f, φ)
= 1−  > 12 .
Therefore, we have λCSR(W, f, φ) > 12 . 
Sufficiency. Let x0 and x1 be a pair of letters from X satisfying that for all s ∈ S there exists y such that
W (y|s, x0) 6= W (y|s, x1). Let k be a sufficiently large integer, and δ be sufficiently small such that for every
s ∈ S,
• T kδ (W (·|s, x0)) and T kδ (W (·|s, x1)) are disjoint,
• W (T kδ (W (·|s, x0))|s
⊗
k, x
⊗
k
0 ) > 1− 2−kν1 and W (T kδ (W (·|s, x1))|s
⊗
k, x
⊗
k
1 ) > 1− 2−kν1 ,
where ν1 is some positive real number, T kδ (W (·|s, xi)) is the δ-letter typical set with respect to the probability
mass function W (·|s, xi) on Y , and a
⊗
k is a sequence with k copies of the letter a.
Set k′ = k · |S| and let E = {x
⊗
k′
0 , x
⊗
k′
1 } be a message set with two elements. We will prove that the decoder
is able to recover the message with the maximal decoding error probability < 2−kν1 if choosing the message
randomly from E and transmitting it directly to the AVC-CSR. To this end, suppose that the state sequence of the
transmission is sk
′ ∈ Sk′ . There must exist an s0 ∈ S occurring more than k times in the sequence sk′ . Assume
that the first k letters of sk
′
are s0 without loss of generality. The decoder estimates the source message as x
⊗
k′
0 if
yk ∈W (T k(W (·|s0, x0))δ|s
⊗
k
0 , x
⊗
k
0 ), and estimates it as x
⊗
k′
1 otherwise, where y
k is the first k letters received
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by the decoder. One can easily verify that the maximal decoding error probability is < 2−kν1 . In fact, this coding
process constructs a virtual binary channel with crossover probability < 2−kν1 < 12 when k is sufficiently large,
whose capacity is positive. Therefore, a positive transmission rate with the maximal decoding error probability can
be achieved. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 16
This appendix proves that the “good” codebook defined in Definition 15 can be generated by a random scheme.
This is a direct consequence of the Chernoff bound. We first bound the value of Pr{|T˜N (C, sN )| < (1−2·2−Nν1)L′}
in (69), where T˜N (C, sN ) = C ∩ T˜N [X, sN ]δ,η is the collection of typical codewords with respect to the state
sequence sN . Then, the lemma is established by the union bound in (70).
For any 1 ≤ l ≤ L′ and sN ∈ SN , denote U(l, sN ) = 0 if XN (l) ∈ TN [X]δ,η, and U(l, sN ) = 1 otherwise. By
Formula (29) and Proposition 1 (see also Remark 3), it follows that
E[U(l, sN )] < 2−Nν1
for 1 ≤ l ≤ L′ and sN ∈ SN .
On account of the Chernoff bound, it holds that
Pr{|T˜N (C, sN )| < (1− 2 · 2−Nν1)L′} = Pr
{
L′∑
l=1
U(l, sN ) > 2 · 2−Nν1L′
}
≤ exp2
(
− 2 · 2−Nν1L′
)
· E
[
exp2
(
L′∑
l=1
U(l, sN )
)]
= exp2
(
− 2 · 2−Nν1L′
)
·
L′∏
l=1
E
[
exp2
(
U(l, sN )
)]
(∗)
≤ exp2
(
− 2 · 2−Nν1L′
)
·
L′∏
l=1
expe
(
E[U(l, sN )]
)
< exp2
(
− 2 · 2−Nν1L′
)
·
L′∏
l=1
expe
(
2−Nν1
)
= exp2
(
− (2− log e) · 2−Nν1L′
)
,
(69)
where exp2(x) represents 2
x, expe(x) represents e
x, and (*) follows because 2t ≤ 1 + t ≤ et for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Thus,
summing Pr{|T˜N (C, sN )| < (1− 2 · 2−Nν1)M ′} over all sN ∈ SN , we have
Pr{C is not “good”} ≤
∑
sN∈SN
Pr{|T˜N (C, sN )| < (1− 2 · 2−Nν1)L′}
≤ exp2
(
N log |S| − (2− log e) · 2−Nν1L′
)
.
(70)
The proof is completed by letting 1 = exp2(N log |S| − (2− log e) · 2−Nν1L′). 
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 18
This appendix constructs a secure partition over a “good” codebook, to ensure secure transmission against
wiretapping through an AVC with constrained channel states. To be precise, let V = {Vs : s ∈ S} be an AVC, X
be a random variable over X , and ZS be a collection of random variables satisfying (30). Suppose that a “good”
codebook C with respect to X (defined in Definition 15) of size L′ = 2R′ is given. This appendix proves that for
any  > 0, τ > 0, and
L < L′ · 2−N [Rd+τ ] = 2N [R′−Rd−τ ],
there exists a equipartition {Cm}Lm=1 on it such that
I(M˜ ;ZN (C, sN )) < 
for every sN ∈ SN when N is sufficiently large, where SN is a sub-collection of SN , and
Rd = lim sup
n→∞
max
sn∈Sn
I¯Psn (X;ZS).
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 17 with slight adjustments on the parameters. We present the proof outline
as follows.
Let N be sufficiently large such that
Rd ≥ max
sn∈SN
I¯PsN (X;ZS)− τ/4. (71)
For any sN ∈ SN , let B(C, sN ) be defined as (37). Then it is clear that Formula (40) follows. With the help of
B(C, sN ), the parameters introduced in Lemma 19 are realized as
A = C, ε = 2−Nν3/2,
l = 2N [R
′−Rd−τ/4],
k = L < 2N [R
′−Rd−τ ],
P = {PsN ,zN : sN ∈ SN , zN ∈ B(C, sN )} ∪ {P0},
(72)
where P0 and PsN ,zN are given by (42) and (43), respectively. The verification that parameters in (72) satisfy the
preconditions in Lemma 19, is given in Appendix E.
The remainder of the proof is now the same as that of Lemma 17 in Section IV, by replacing the parameters in
(41) with those in (72) and the references of sN ∈ SN with sN ∈ SN . 
APPENDIX E
VERIFICATION ON THE RATIONALITY OF PARAMETERS IN FORMULAS (41) AND (72)
This subsection proves that the parameters realized in (41) and (72) are rational and they satisfy the preconditions
of Lemma 19, when the codeword length N is sufficiently large.
Verification on the rationality of (41).
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We rewrite the parameters in (41) here for convenience.
A = C, ε = 2−Nν3/2,
l = 2N [R
′−maxs∈S I(X;Zs)−τ/2],
k = L < 2N [R
′−maxs∈S I(X;Zs)−τ ],
P = {PsN ,zN : sN ∈ SN , zN ∈ B(C, sN )} ∪ {P0},
where the size of C is L′ = 2NR′ , and B(C, sN ), P0 and PsN ,zN are given by (37), (42) and (43), respectively.
Proof of ε < 19 . It follows because ε = 2
−Nν3/2 can be arbitrarily small as N →∞.
Proof of k log k ≤ 2l3 log(2|P|) . It follows clearly that |P| < (|S||Z|)N . Therefore, we have
ε2l
3 log(2|P|) =
1
3 log(2|P|)2
N [R′−maxs∈S I(X;Zs)−τ/2−ν3]
> 2N [R
′−maxs∈S I(X;Zs)−τ/2−ν3− log[3N·log(2|S||Z|)]N ]
(a)
> 2N [R
′−maxs∈S I(X;Zs)−3τ/4] (b)> L logL = k log k,
where the inequalities (a) and (b) follow when ν3 is sufficiently small and N is sufficiently large.
Proof of (36). Notice that XN (C) is uniformly distributed over the codebook C of size L′ = 2NR′ . This indicates
that
P0(x
N ) = Pr{XN (C) = xN} = L′−1 = 2−NR′ < l−1
for any xN ∈ C. Therefore ∑
xN∈C:P0(xN )>l−1
P0(x
N ) = 0 < ε, (73)
which is of (36) for P0.
To establish (36) for PsN ,zN with sN ∈ SN and zN ∈ B(C, sN ), let
T˜ (C, sN , zN ) = C ∩ T˜N [XZS |sN , zN ]2δ,η (74)
be the set of codewords which are jointly typical with zN under the state sequence sN . It follows that for any
xN ∈ T˜ (C, sN , zN ),
PsN ,zN (x
N ) = Pr{X
N (C)=xN ,ZN (C,sN )=zN}
Pr{ZN (C,sN )=zN}
(a)
=
∏N
i=1 PZsi |X(zi|xi)
L′·Pr{ZN (C,sN )=zN}
(b)
≤
∏N
i=1 PZsi |X(zi|xi)
2−Nν3/2L′·∏Ni=1 PZsi (zi)
(c)
≤ 2
−N(1−2δ−η)H¯P
sN
(ZS|X)
2−Nν3/2L′·2−N[(1+2δ)H¯PzN (ZS )−η logmYS ]
(d)
≤ 2−N [R′−I¯PsN (X;ZS)−(4δ+η)H¯PsN (ZS)+η logmYS+ν3/2]
(e)
≤ 2−N [R′−maxs∈S I(X;Zs)−(4δ+η)H¯PsN (ZS)+η logmYS−ν3/2]
(f)
≤ 2−N [R′−maxs∈S I(X;Zs)−τ/2] = l−1,
(75)
where
• (a) follows from (32);
• (b) follows because zN ∈ B(C, sN ) implies zN /∈ B1(C, sN ) (see Formulas (37) and (39));
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• (c) follows from the fact of (xN , zN ) ∈ T˜N [XZS , sN ]2δ,η along with Propositions 1 and 5;
• (d) follows from the facts that L′ = 2NR
′
and H¯PsN (ZS |X) ≤ H¯PsN (ZS);
• (e) follows from (3);
• and (f) follows when δ, η and ν3 are sufficiently small.
Recalling that zN ∈ B(C, sN ) implies zN ∈ B0(C, sN ) (cf. (37)), it follows from (75) and (38) that∑
xN∈C:PsN ,zN (xN )>l−1
PsN ,zN (x
N ) ≤ 1− Pr{XN (C) ∈ T˜ (sN , zN , C)|ZN (C, sN ) = zN}
< 2−Nν3/2 = ε,
which is of (36) for PsN ,zN . The verification is completed. 
Verification on the rationality of (72).
The verification of (72) is quite similar to the verification of (41). The only difference is that the state sequence
sN runs over a subset SN of SN when verifying (72). We only prove that PsN ,zN (xN ) < l−1 for sN ∈ SN ,
zN ∈ B(C, zN ) and xN ∈ T˜ (C, sN , zN ), where B(C, zN ) is defined in (37) and T˜ (C, sN , zN ) is defined in (74).
In fact,
PsN ,zN (x
N )
(a)
≤ 2−N [R′−I¯PsN (X;ZS)−(4δ+η)H¯PsN (ZS)+η logmYS+ν3/2]
(b)
≤ 2−N [R′−Rd−τ/4−(4δ+η)H¯PsN (ZS)+η logmYS−ν3/2]
(c)
≤ 2−N [R′−Rd−τ/2] = l−1,
where (a) follows from the inequalities (a)-(d) in (75), (b) follows from (71), and (c) follows when δ, η and ν3 are
sufficiently small. The verification is completed. 
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 21
In this appendix, we prove that the random coding scheme introduced in Subsection V-A is able to create a
deterministic codebook with high probability, such that the average decoding error probability over the AVC-CSR
is vanishing. This establishes the capacity of deterministic code over the AVC-CSR with respect to the average
decoding error probability.
To simplify the notation, let
XN ([1 : m]) = (XN (1), XN (2), ..., XN (m)),
and
xN ([1 : m]) = (xN (1), xN (2), ..., xN (m)).
According to the decoding scheme in Subsection V-A, for every given codebook C = {xN (m)}Lm=1, the decoding
error probability of the message m is totally determined by the codewords xN ([1 : m]) and the state sequence sN .
Let em[xN (m), xN ([1 : m− 1]), sN ] be the decoding error probability of the message m under the state sequence
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sN when the first m codewords are xN ([1 : m]). Then the average decoding error probability under the state
sequence sN can be rewritten as
e¯CSR(C, sN ) = 1
L
L∑
m=1
em[x
N (m), xN ([1 : m− 1]), sN ].
The proof of Lemma 21 is organized as the following 3 steps.
• Step 1 shows that there exists ν > 0 such that
Pr{em[XN (m), xN ([1 : m− 1]), sN ] > 2 · 2−Nν2} < 2−Nν (76)
for every 1 ≤ m ≤ L, xN ([1 : m− 1]) ⊆ XN×(m−1) and sN ∈ SN , when N is sufficiently large. This means
no matter what values the first m− 1 codewords are, if choosing the m-th codewords randomly, one can get a
“good” codeword with a high probability, such that the decoding error probability of message m is very small.
• Step 2 proves that
Pr
{
1
L
N∑
m=1
em[X
N (m), XN ([1 : m− 1]), sN ] > 
}
< exp2(−L/2) (77)
for every sN ∈ SN , when N is sufficiently large. This means for every sequence sN , the probability that
random codebook fails to achieve a vanishing average decoding error probability is doubly exponential small.
• Step 3 establishes (50) by the union bound.
Proof of Step 1. In this part, random events Err1 and Err2 are introduced, and the value of Pr{em[XN (m), xN ([1 :
m − 1]), sN ] > 2 · 2−Nν2} is bounded by Formula (78). Formula (76) is finally proved by substituting Formulas
(80) and (82) into (78).
According to the decoding scheme, if formulas (47) and (48) hold, it must follow that
em[x
N (m), xN ([1 : m− 1]), sN ] ≤ 2 · 2−Nν2 .
Therefore,
Pr{em[XN (m), xN ([1 : m− 1]), sN ] > 2 · 2−Nν2} ≤ Pr{Err1 = 1}+ Pr{Err2 = 1|Err1 = 0}, (78)
where Err1 = 1 (or = 0) represents that the random event XN (m) ∈ X1 happens (or not), and Err2 = 1 (or = 0)
represents that the random event XN (m) ∈ X2 happens (or not). The sets X1 and X2 are defined as
X1 = XN \ T˜N [X, sN ]δ,η
and
X2 = {xN : W (T˜N [XYS , sN |xN ]2δ,η \ D˜m−1(sN )|xN , sN ) < 1− 2 · 2−Nν2}. (79)
On account of Proposition 1, we have
Pr{Err1 = 1} < 2−Nν1 . (80)
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It remains to bound the value of Pr{Err2 = 1|Err1 = 0}. To achieve this, notice that for every xN ∈ T˜N [X, sN ]δ,η
(or, equivalently, xN ∈ XN \ X1), Proposition 7 gives
W (T˜N [XYS , sN |xN (m)]2δ,η|xN , sN ) > 1− 2−Nν2 . (81)
Therefore, if xN ∈ X2 \ X1, it follows from (81) and (79) that
W (D˜m−1(sN )|xN , sN ) > 2−Nν2 .
This indicates that
(X2 \ X1) ⊆ (X3 \ X1),
where
X3 = {xN ∈ XN : W (D˜m−1(sN )|xN , sN ) > 2−Nν2}.
Therefore, we have
Pr{Err2 = 1|Err1 = 0} ≤ Pr{Err3 = 1|Err1 = 0},
where Err3 = 1 (or = 0) represents that the random event XN (m) ∈ X3 happens (or not).
To bound the value of Pr{Err3 = 1|Err1 = 0}, notice that no matter what the value of D˜m−1(sN ) is, Corollary
6 always indicates that
Pr{Y N (sN ) ∈ D˜m−1(sN )} =
∑
1≤l≤m−1
Pr{Y N (sN ) ∈ Dl(sN )}
≤
∑
1≤l≤m−1
Pr{Y N (sN ) ∈ T˜N [XYS , sN |xN (l)]2δ,η}
(∗)
< L · 2−N [I¯PsN (X;YS)−(4δ+η)H¯PsN (YS)+η logmXYS ]
< 2
−N [τ/2−(4δ+η)H¯P
sN
(YS)+η logmXYS ]
< 2−Nτ/4
when δ and η are sufficiently small, where (*) follows because L < 2N [mins∈S I(X;Ys)−τ/2] < 2N [I¯PsN (X;YS)−τ/2].
Combining the formula above and the following inequality
Pr{Y N (sN ) ∈ D˜m−1(sN )} =
∑
xN∈XN
Pr{XN (l) = xN}W (D˜m−1(sN )|xN , sN )
> Pr{XN (l) ∈ X3} · 2−Nν2 = Pr{Err3 = 1} · 2−Nν2 ,
it is concluded that
Pr{Err3 = 1} < 2−N(τ/4−ν2).
Therefore,
Pr{Err2 = 1|Err1 = 0} ≤ Pr{Err3 = 1|Err1 = 0} ≤ Pr{Err3 = 1}
Pr{Err1 = 0} < 2 · 2
−N(τ/4−ν2) (82)
when N is sufficiently large. Substituting Formulas (80) and (82) into (78) gives
Pr{em[XN (m), xN ([1 : m− 1]), sN ] > 2 · 2−Nν2} < 2−Nν1 + 2 · 2−N(τ/4−ν2) < 2−Nν
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for some ν > 0, where ν2 can be set as arbitrarily small without violating Proposition 7. The proof of Step 1 is
completed. 
Proof of Step 2. The proof depends on the following lemma.
Lemma 32: Let Am, 1 ≤ m ≤ L be a series of (not necessarily mutually independent) random variables with
Am distributed over Am such that
E[fm(Am)|A1 = a1, A2 = a2, ..., Am−1 = am−1] < b (83)
for arbitrary a1 ∈ A1, a2 ∈ A2, ..., am−1 ∈ Am−1 with Pr{A1 = a1, A2 = a2, ..., Am−1 = am−1} > 0, where
fm : Am 7→ (0,∞), 1 ≤ m ≤ L are bounded and b > 0 is a constant real number. Then it follows that
E
[
L∏
m=1
fm(Am)
]
< bL.
The proof of Lemma 32 is deferred to the end of this appendix.
On account of the Chernoff bound, for any given sN , it follows that
Pr
{
1
L
N∑
m=1
em[X
N (m), XN ([1 : m− 1]), sN ] > 
}
< exp2(−L)E
[
exp2
(
L∑
m=1
em[X
N (m), XN ([1 : n− 1]), sN ]
)]
= exp2(−L)E
[
L∏
m=1
exp2
(
em[X
N (m), XN ([1 : n− 1]), sN ]
)]
.
(84)
To proceed with the upper bounding, let Am = XN ([1 : m]) and f(Am) = exp2(em[X
N (m), XN ([1 : n−1]), sN ]).
This indicates that
E
[
f(Am)|XN ([1 : m− 1]) = xN ([1 : m− 1])
]
= E
[
exp2
(
em[X
N (m), xN ([1 : m− 1]), sN ]
)]
≤ 2 · Pr
{
em[X
N (m), xN ([1 : m− 1]), sN ] > 2 · 2−Nν2
}
+ exp2(2 · 2−Nν2)
(a)
< 2 · 2−Nν + exp2(2 · 2−Nν2)
< exp2(2 · 2−Nν2) · (1 + 21−Nν)
(b)
< exp2(2
1−Nν2) · expe(21−Nν)
(85)
for every xN ([1 : m− 1]), where (a) follows from (76) and (b) follows from the inequality 1 + t ≤ et for t ≥ 0.
Consequently, Lemma 32 gives
E
[
L∏
m=1
exp2
(
em[X
N (m), XN ([1 : n− 1]), sN ]
)]
= E
[
L∏
m=1
f(Am)
]
<
[
exp2(2
1−Nν2) · expe(21−Nν)
]L
.
(86)
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Substituting (86) into (84), we have
Pr
{
1
L
N∑
m=1
em[X
N (m), XN ([1 : m− 1]), sN ] > 
}
< exp2(−L)E
[
L∏
m=1
exp2
(
em[X
N (m), XN ([1 : n− 1]), sN ]
)]
< exp2(−L(− 21−Nν2 − 21−Nν log e))
< exp2(−L/2)
when N is sufficiently small. The proof of Step 2 is completed. 
Proof of Step 3. According to the union bound, Formula (77) gives
Pr
{
max
sN∈SN
e¯CSR(C, sN ) > 
}
= Pr
{
max
sN∈SN
[
1
L
N∑
m=1
em[X
N (m), XN ([1 : m− 1]), sN ]
]
> 
}
≤
∑
sN∈SN
Pr
{
1
L
N∑
m=1
em[X
N (m), XN ([1 : m− 1]), sN ] > 
}
< |S|N · exp2(−L/2) = 3.
The proof of Lemma 21 is completed. 
Proof of Lemma 32. The lemma is proved by induction on the number L of random variables. It is clear that
the lemma is true when L = 1. Suppose that the lemma holds for L = L0 ≥ 1. When L = L0 + 1 we have
E[
L0+1∏
m=1
f(Am)] =
∑
a[1:L0+1]
{
p{a[1 : L0 + 1]}
L0+1∏
m=1
f(am)
}
=
∑
a[1:L0]
{[
p{a[1 : L0]}
L0∏
m=1
f(am)
][ ∑
aL0+1
p{aL0+1|a[1 : L0]}f(aL0+1)
]}
=
∑
a[1:L0]
{[
p{a[1 : L0]}
L0∏
m=1
f(am)
]
E{f(AL0+1)|A[1 : L0] = a[1 : L0]}
}
(a)
≤ b ·
∑
a[1:L0]
{
p{a[1 : L0]}
[
L0∏
m=1
f(am)
]}
= b · E[
L0∏
m=1
f(Am)]
(b)
≤ bL0+1,
where p{a[1 : L]} is short for Pr{A[1 : L] = a[1 : L]}, p{aL0+1|a[1 : L0]} is short for Pr{AL0+1 = aL0+1|A[1 :
L0] = a[1 : L0]}, and
∑
a[1:L] is short for
∑
a1∈A1,a2∈A2,...,aL∈AL . Inequality (a) follows from (83) and Inequality
(b) follows from the induction assumption. The proof is completed. 
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 25
This appendix establishes a pair of upper bounds on the secrecy capacities of stochastic code over the AVWC
and AVWC-CSR. Since the proofs of AVWC and AVWC-CSR are similar, we only give the proof of AVWC. To
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be precise, for any  > 0, suppose that there exists a stochastic code (F, φ) of length N , satisfying
λ(W, F, φ) <  and max
sN∈SN
I(M ;ZN (sN )) < , (87)
where M is the source message uniformly distributed over the message set M, and ZN (sN ), defined in (21), is
the output of wiretap AVC under the state sequence sN . We need to show that its transmission rate follows that
R =
1
N
log |M| ≤ min
q∈P(S),s∈S
max
Uq,s
[I(Uq,s;Yq)− I(Uq,s;Zs)] + ′,
where ′ → 0 as → 0, and (Uq,s, Yq, Zs) satisfies (24) and (25) with U = Uq,s.
The proof is organized as the following two steps.
• The first step proves that for any stochastic code satisfying (87), its transmission rate should satisfy (88). The
key idea is to show that if a stochastic code achieves a vanishing decoding error over the AVC W , it also
achieves a vanishing decoding error over the AVC W¯ , where W¯ is the convex hull of W , defined in (5).
• The final step establishes the upper bound using the standard technique. To be concrete, we first obtain (90)
by definition, which is further derived to (93) by the technique of single letterization introduced in [19].
Proof of Step 1. Let (F, φ) be a pair of stochastic encoder and decoder over the AVWC (W,V) satisfying (87).
For any q ∈ P(S), let the random sequence Y Nq satisfy
Pr{Y Nq = yN |XN = xN} = Wq(yN |xN ) =
N∏
i=1
Wq(yi|xi)
for yN ∈ YN and xN ∈ XN , where Wq is defined in (6). Then for any m ∈M, the decoding error probability of
the message m achieved by the code (F, φ) over the DMC Wq is given by
λm({Wq}, F, φ) =
∑
xN∈XN
[
Pr{F (m) = xN}(1−Wq(φ−1(m)|xN ))
]
=
∑
xN∈XN
∑
sN∈SN
[
Pr{F (m) = xN}q(sN )(1−W (φ−1(m)|xN , sN ))
]
=
∑
sN∈SN
{
q(sN )
[ ∑
xN∈XN
Pr{F (m) = xN}(1−W (φ−1(m)|xN , sN ))
]}
=
∑
sN∈SN
[
q(sN )λm(W, F, φ, sN )
]
≤
∑
sN∈SN
[
q(sN )λ(W, F, φ, sN )
]
≤ λ(W, F, φ) < ,
where λm(W, F, φ, sN ) is given in (12), λ(W, F, φ, sN ) is given in (11), λ(W, F, φ) is given in (10), and
q(sN ) =
N∏
i=1
q(si).
On account of the Fano’s inequality, the transmission rate satisfies that
NR ≤ I(M ;Y Nq ) +Nδ() (88)
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for every q ∈ P(S), where δ()→ 0 as → 0. 
Proof of Step 2. For any s ∈ S, let ZNs be the output of the wiretap AVC when the state sequence is N copies
of s, i.e.
Pr{ZNs = zN |XN = xN} =
N∏
i=1
Vs(zi|xi)
for zN ∈ ZN and xN ∈ XN . By the definition of achievability in Definition 9, it follows that
I(M ;ZNs ) <  (89)
for any s ∈ S. Combining (88) and (89) gives
NR ≤ I(M ;Y Nq )− I(M ;ZNs ) +Nδ() +  (90)
for any q ∈ P(S) and s ∈ S. By the similar way of establishing Equations (38) and (39) in [19] along with Lemma
7 in [19], the value of I(M ;Y Nq )− I(M ;ZNs ) follows that
I(M ;Y Nq )− I(M ;ZNs ) =
N∑
i=1
[
I(M ;Yq,i|Y i−1q , ZNs,i+1)− I(M ;Zs,i|Y i−1q , ZNs,i+1)
]
,
where Y i−1q = (Yq,1, Yq,2, ..., Yq,i−1) and Z
N
s,i+1 = (Zs,i+1, Zs,i+2, ..., Zs,N ). Let Vq,s,i = (Y
i−1
q , Z
N
s,i+1). The
formula above can be rewritten as
I(M ;Y Nq )− I(M ;ZNs ) =
N∑
i=1
[
I(M ;Yq,i|Vq,s,i)− I(M ;Zs,i|Vq,s,i)
]
=
N∑
i=1
[
I(M,Vq,s,i;Yq,i|Vq,s,i)− I(M,Vq,s,i;Zs,i|Vq,s,i)
]
.
Let J be a random variable uniformly distributed over [1 : N ] and independent of M,Y Nq , Z
N
s and V
N
q,s =
(Vq,s,1, Vq,s,2, ..., Vq,s,N ). We obtain that
I(M ;Y Nq )− I(M ;ZNs ) = N [I(M,Vq,s,J ;Yq,J |Vq,s,J , J)− I(M,Vq,s,J ;Zs,J |Vq,s,J , J)]
= N [I(M,Vq,s,J , J ;Yq,J |Vq,s,J , J)− I(M,Vq,s,J , J ;Zs,J |Vq,s,J , J)]
Set
Vq,s = (Vq,s, J), Uq,s = (M,Vq,s), X = XJ , Yq = Yq,J and Zs = Zs,J . (91)
It follows that
I(M ;Y Nq )− I(M ;ZNs ) = N · [I(Uq,s;Yq|Vq,s)− I(Uq,s;Zs|Vq,s)] ≤ max
Uq,s
N · [I(Uq,s;Yq)− I(Uq,s;Zs)], (92)
where Vq,s → Uq,s → X → (Yq, Zs) forms a Markov chain.
Substituting (92) into (90) gives
R ≤ max
Uq,s
[I(Uq,s;Yq)− I(Uq,s;Zs)] + + δ().
Since q and s can be arbitrary, we have
R ≤ min
q∈P(S),s∈S
max
Uq,s
[I(Uq,s;Yq)− I(Uq,s;Zs)] + + δ(). (93)
The proof is completed by setting ′ = + δ(). 
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APPENDIX H
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 26
This appendix establishes the secrecy capacity of stochastic code over the AVWC, when the main AVC is severely
less noisy than the wiretap AVC. To be precise, for any  > 0, suppose that there exists a stochastic code (F, φ) of
length N , satisfying
λ(W, F, φ) <  and max
sN∈SN
I(M ;ZN (sN )) < , (94)
where M is the source message uniformly distributed over the message set M, and ZN (sN ), defined in (21), is
the output of the wiretap AVC under the state sequence sN . It suffices to show that its transmission rate follows
that
R =
1
N
log |M| ≤ max
X
min
q∈P(S),s∈S
[X;Yq)− I(X;Zs)] + ′,
where ′ → 0 as → 0 and (X,Yq, Zs) satisfies (62).
The proof is organized as follows. Equation (95) is first obtained by the technique introduced in Appendix G.
Then, Equation (96) is obtained by the definition of severely less noisy AVCs. The proposition is finally established
by (97).
Let (F, φ) be a pair of stochastic encoder and decoder satisfying (94). By the same way of establishing (90) and
(92), for any q ∈ P(S) and s ∈ S, we have
R ≤ I(Uq,s;Yq|Vq,s)− I(Uq,s;Zs|Vq,s) + + δ(), (95)
where (Vq,s, Uq,s, X, Yq, Zs) is a collection of random variables introduced in (91), and Vq,s → Uq,s → X →
(Yq, Zs) forms a Markov chain.
The value of I(Uq,s;Yq|Vq,s)− I(Uq,s;Zs|Vq,s) can be bounded by
I(Uq,s;Yq|Vq,s)− I(Uq,s;Zs|Vq,s)
= I(Uq,s, X;Yq|Vq,s)− I(Uq,s, X;Zs|Vq,s)− I(X;Yq|Uq,s, Vq,s) + I(X;Zs|Uq,s, Vq,s)
≤ I(Uq,s, X;Yq|Vq,s)− I(Uq,s, X;Zs|Vq,s)
= I(Uq,s, Vq,s, X;Yq)− I(Uq,s, Vq,s, X;Zs)− I(Vq,s;Yq) + I(Vq,s;Zs)
≤ I(Uq,s, Vq,s, X;Yq)− I(Uq,s, Vq,s, X;Zs)
= I(X;Yq)− I(X;Zs),
(96)
where the inequalities follow from the definition of severely less noisy AVCs, and the last equation follows from
the Markov chain Vq,s → Uq,s → X → (Yq, Zs).
Substituting (96) into (95) gives
R ≤ I(X;Yq)− I(X;Zs) + + δ().
Since q and s are arbitrary, we have
R ≤ min
q∈P(S),s∈S
[I(X;Yq)− I(X;Zs)] + + δ() ≤ max
X
min
q∈P(S),s∈S
[I(X;Yq)− I(X;Zs)] + + δ(). (97)
Notice that the random variable X is unrelated to q and s. The proof is completed by setting ′ = + δ(). 
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